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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Threats Inducing Emotional Reactions.
Showing blackjacks, the defendants threatened the plaintiffs with
physical harm, and because this offer to commit immediate bodily harm
generated great fear and distress, the plaintiffs became ill. On demurrer to the complaint, of which the above is a paraphrase, the court held
that: (1) there was no assault and (2) there was no action for the
alleged illness.1
As to the assault, there are many statements in the books which
seem to support the result since there was no allegation of an "overt
act." "Mere words do not constitute an assault" has been stated frequently by text writers2 and stated or implied by the courts. There appears to be no satisfactory explanation for such a result where the parties are face to face.3 The plaintiffs believed that the defendants would
carry out immediately their manifested intent of striking them unless
their orders were obeyed. These facts spell civil assault at common
law. There is in fact little judicial authority for the requirement of a
threatening movement. In many of the cases, including the one cited
by the court, 4 the statement that "mere words" are not sufficient is the
merest dictum.5 In some of the cases, it is said that there must be an
offer of corporeal harm, an ambiguous expression taken from textbooks. 6
Again these statements are mostly dicta. 7 The largest number of cases
in which the expression is used involve criminal assaults8 and, despite
an occasional case to the contrary, 9 it is generally recognized that the
1
Cucinotti v. Ortman, 339 Pa. 26, 159 A2d 216 (1950).
2 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 3.5 (1956) ; RESTATEmT, TORTS § 31 (1934).
' See PROSSER, TORTS § 10 (2d ed. 1955).
' Bechtel v. Combs, 70 Pa. Super. 503 (1918) (telephone threat).
Kramer v. Ricksmeier, 159 Iowa 48, 139 N.W. 1091 (1913) (telephone threat);
Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926) (no force was threatened) ; Continental Cas. Co. v. Garrett, 173 Miss. 676, 161 So. 753 (1935) (threats
by trespasser causing illness; recovery allowed).

'As in 1 COOLEY, TORTS §95 (4th ed. 1932).

'Brown v. Crawford, 296 Ky. 249, 177 S.W.2d 1 (1943) ; Tinkler v. Richter,

295 Mich. 396, 295 N.W. 201 (1940) ; Jenkins v. Kentucky Hotel, 261 Ky. 419, 87
S.W.2d 951 (1935) (dictum).
'State v. Daniel, 136 N.C. 571, 48 S.E. 544 (1904), is typical; holding that it
was incorrect for the trial court to charge that "if the defendant cursed the prose-

cutor, Alston, and ordered him to come to him and Alston obeyed through fear,
the defendant was guilty of an assault." the court said: "Mere words, however
insulting or abusive, will not constitute an assault, nor will a mere threat or violence menaced, as distinguished from violence begun to be executed ....
[T]he
defendant must have committed some act in execution of his purpose." State v.
Daniel, .supra at 573, 574, 48 S.E. at 544, 545.

'Texas Bus Lines v. Anderson, 233 S.W.2d 961 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (where

plaintiff was denied entrance to a bus but refrained from getting near enough to be
struck). See also Stark v. Exler, 58 Ore. 262, 117 Pac. 276 (1911), in which, in
a civil action for a battery, the court gratuitously says that a civil assault is the
intentional attempt to do violence to another.
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two species of assault have quite different elements. At common law,
criminal assault does not involve knowledge by the plaintiff of the defendant's conduct, as is true of civil assault; the latter, in turn, does
not involve an attempt to commit a battery,' 0 a usual requirement in
criminal assault, It may be that the distinction commonly made in the
criminal law between attempts and preparation, throws the cases involving only words into the latter category.'" On the other hand, without making an exhaustive survey of the cases, I have found a few which
support the position that activity by the defendant is evidence, but not
the only evidence, of the defendant's intent to strike immediately and of
the plaintiff's apprehension.' 2 The Advisors for the Restatement of
Torts, Second, have recommended a statement to that effect.' 3
The second issue involved a far more important matter than the
question whether a contemporaneous movement by the defendant is a
requirement for a technical assault. By its decision the court has placed
itself squarely against the progress made by the courts in the last half
century. There is here not merely an interference with the peace of
mind for which some other courts allow an action under similar circumstances, even though not resulting in physical harm.' 4 The action
is not one based upon negligence or other tortious conduct directed towards third persons which causes a mental shock with resulting physical
harm to the plaintiff who in some -states is denied a cause of action.' 5
This result is at least arguable, since otherwise an inadvertent defendant
might become liable to a large number of spectators witnessing a catastrophe.
1

1

REsTATEmENT, TORTS §§

21, 28 (1934).

As in Fennell v. State, 164 Ga. 54, 137 S.E. 762 (1927) ; Merritt v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 653, 180 S.E. 395 (1935) (not an attempt to point a pistol at
plaintiff).
"Republic Steel & Iron Co. v. Self, 122 Ala. 402, 68 So. 328 (1915) (stated
that whether language constitutes an assault depends upon the manner and tone
of the speaker)d; Haup v. Evenson, 125 Iowa 634, 101 N.W. 520 (1904) (instruction found not bad which stated that assault is a menace by word or act, where
there was evidence of an apparent intent to carry ont the threat) ; Cressey v. Republic Creasoting Co., 108 Minn. 342, 122 N.W. 484 (1909) (instruction that a
wrongful threat to do bodily violence with present ability is good).
§s s31
(Tent. Draft No. 1 1957): "Words
"oRESTATEMENT (SECOND), TOR

do not make the actor liable for assault unless, together with other acts or circumstances, they put the other in reasonable apprehension of an imminent harmful or
offensive contact with his person."
" State Rubbish Collectors v. Silignoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 240 P.2d 282- (1952), in
which both compensatory and punitive damages were awarded for the mental
suffering with faef§,similar iothe ones here dealt with. To avoid useless litigation,
recovety is properly limited to outrageous conduct. Gillianss v. Eastern Air
Lines,.194 F.24'774 (5th Cir. 1952); Wallace v. Shoreham Hotel Corp., 49 A.2d
81 (Mdnic.,Ct.App.'D.C. 1946).
'dWaube V..WarHngtn', 276 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935) (as a matter of
social expediencO. The courts are more apt to find liability where the defendant's
act, although 'directed against a third person, is intentionally wrongful. Rogers v.
Willard, 144 Ark. 587, 223 S.W. 15 (1920) (assault on plaintiff's husband in plaintiff's presence).' '"
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Again, our principal case is not one in which the defendant has been
negligent to the plaintiff but has not caused an impact, in which situation
the Pennsylvania courts have consistently denied damages for the physical harm resulting from the fear suffered by the plaintiff.16 Again the
result is arguable. Negligence does not necessarily connote personal
fault; it may result from a momentary inadvertence, to which all are
subject, or from ingrained stupidity, from which one cannot escape.
There is danger of fake testimony which, with the aid of partisan expert
witnesses, may mislead jurors into making a mountain out of a molehill.
Further, if there has been no impact upon the plaintiff, the defendant
may not even be aware of the incident for some time and hence be unable
to recall it or to get witnesses. It is clear that such cases require careful
and expert handling by the courts. But most courts have reached the
conclusion that an action should be allowed if the proof is clear.17
Whatever we may think about the negligence cases, it is obvious that
they afford no precedent for denying recovery in such a case as the
present in which the defendants deliberately set about disturbing the
plaintiffs' minds for the purpose of causing them serious worry. Beginning at least in 1897, the courts have allowed recovery where a defendant did an act or said words, intended by him to distress the plaintiff
and which he should have realized might affect the plaintiff's health.
Many of the cases involve misguided "practical jokers."' 8 There are
also the many cases, involving the recently protected right of privacy,
where there may be only bad judgment as to the proper limits to publicizing facts about the plaintiff'" or the overzealous acts of creditors who
exceed the bounds of propriety and whom the debtor can hold liable
although he has suffered only chagrin or embarrassment. 20 This type
of conduct is bad but certainly far less so than threats with blackjacks.
It is arguable that mere threats without resulting physical harm should
not be the subject of a civil action. But where the plaintiffs have become
ill from the threats (as we must assume from the pleading that they did),
the court should not leave them kithout redress. In fact the court in
" This is true even though the evidence of the plaintiff's physical deterioration

as a result of the fear is beyond question, as in Bosley v. Andrews, 303 Pa. 161,
142 A2d 263 (1958), where plaintiff suffered a heart attack caused by fear of
defendant's trespassing and threatening bull (a case mentioned by Mr. Justice
Musmanno in hopelessly dissenting).

"'The prevailing view is presented in Orlo v. Connecticutt Co., 128 Conn. 231
21 A2d 402 (1941). See the review of cases in 2 HAaRm & JAMEs, ToaRTs § 18.4
(1956).
"

Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57 (a "practical joker" told plaintiff

that her husband had been badly injured); Bielitzki v. Obadisk, 65 D.L.R. 627
(1922) (similar).

"Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951) (photograph
of plaintiff in disheveled clothes, two years after the accident of which she was the
victim).
2

Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956)
vasion of privacy).

(said to be an in-
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effect is telling the modern highwaymen how to ply their trade without
civil liability,2 1 except for their plunder. The formula is simple: "Show
your blackjacks, but don't move them or touch your victims."
WARREN A. SEAvEY*

Conflict of Laws-Tort and Partial "Release" in Different
Jurisdictions-What Law Governs Construction of Instrument.
At common law a release of one joint tort-feasor results in the release of all others. It makes no difference whether the respective acts
of the several tort-feasors were in concert, merely concurrent, or even
successive ;1 it matters only that the combined acts produced a single,
indivisible injury.2 The reason generally assigned for this result is that
a single injury represents a single cause of action, which cannot be split
by being released as to one tort-feasor while being preserved as to
another. A release is thus regarded as an absolute, unconditional extinction of a cause of action. 3 This reasoning gave rise to the judicial
presumption that a release, even if granted to less than all who were
(allegedly) jointly responsible for the injury, was executed only in
exchange for a complete satisfaction of the claim. It was the view of
the courts, therefore, that to allow the injured party to release one joint
tort-feasor and subsequently to recover a judgment from another theoretically would permit the victim to recover more than he had lost
Assuming the soundness of this reasoning at the time at which it evolved,
it is nevertheless highly questionable whether the use of this irrebuttable
presumption is a just method of preventing excessive recoveries now.
211 assume that the defendants might have been bound over to keep the peace
or been charged with an attempt at extortion.
* Babcock Professor of Law, Wake Forest College. Professor of Law eneritus,
Harvard University.
1
Intentional torts by their very definition at common law must have been concurrent in order to give rise to joint tort-feasorship. See Garrett v. Garrett, 228
N.C. 530, 46 S.E.2d 302 (1948) ; PRossER, TORTS § 46, n. 29 (2d ed. 1955).
- Sheppard v. Atlantic States Gas Co., 72 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Pa. 1947) ; Morris
v. Diers, 134 Colo. 39, 298 P.2d 957 (1956) ; PRossER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 46.
A few American jurisdictions have attempted to make a common-law distinction
(both in negligent and intentional torts) between tort-feasors who act in concert
and those whose acts are merely concurrent. Husky Refining Co. v. Barnes, 119
F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1941) (Idaho law) ; Bee v. Cooper, 217 Cal. 96, 17 P.2d 740
(1932). There is a considerable variance between the laws of the several jurisdictions as to the effect of a release given to one who is subsequently adjudged not
to have been jointly liable with those charged with the injury. See, e.g., Bolton v.
Ziegler, 111 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ind. 1953) ; Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal.2d
705, 160 P.2d 783 (1945) ; Holland v. Southern Pub. Util. Co., 208 N.C. 289, 180
S.E. 592 (1935); Howard v. J. H. Harris Plumbing Co., 154 N.C. 225, 70 S.E.
285 (1911) ; Harris v. City of Roanoke, 179 Va. 1, 18 S.E2d 303 (1942) ; Papenfu§
v. Shell Oil Co., 254 Wis. 233, 35 N.W.2d 920 (1949).
'Roper v. Florida Pub. Util. Co., 131 Fla. 709, 179 So. 904 (1938) ; PRossER,
op. cit. supra note 1, § 46.
'Lysfjord v. Flintkote Co., 135 F. Supp. 672 (S.D. Cal. 1955) ; Morris v. Diers,
134 Colo. 39, 298 P.2d 957 (1956).
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Today the situation often arises where one of several joint tortfeasors wishes to settle his share of the injured party's claim without
resorting to the courts. The consideration paid for such a settlement
is usually the settling tort-feasor's fractional share of the total amount
claimed by the victim or a lesser amount agreed upon through compromise. In many American jurisdictions a general release given to the
settling tort-feasor, even where the instrument specifically reserves the
injured party's rights against other alleged tort-feasors, will still result
today in a complete extinction of the cause of action and a bar to further
recovery. 5 This has led to the development and use of the covenant
not to sue, by which the settling tort-feasor can be protected from further
action by the plaintiff,6 leaving the plaintiff free to seek the remainder
of his damages from the other joint tort-feasors.7 The practical difference between a release and a covenant is virtually nil8 as far as the
settling tort-feasor is concerned. Many courts, however, continue to
adhere rigidly to the technical distinctions, finding a common law release wherever the traditional form and language appear, even though
the intent of the parties may otherwise be indicated plainly to the contrary.9 Some jurisdictions, however, have enacted statutes eliminating
the presumption and automatic extinction of the cause of action. 10
Others have greatly lessened the harshness of the common law rule in
many instances by construing instruments as covenants, especially where
there is a specific reservation of rights against other joint tort-feasors
or an otherwise clear indication that the settlement was not made in
complete satisfaction of the injury." Apparently only Virginia still adheres to the rule that any settlement with one or all joint tort-feasors
conclusively presumes a complete satisfaction which bars any further
12
recovery on the claim.
Butler v. Norfolk So. Ry., 140 F. Supp. 601 (E.D.N.C. 1956) ; PaossER, op.
cit. supra note 1, § 46 and cases therein cited.
'What effect the settlement might have upon the other tort-feasors' right to
contribution from the settling tort-feasor varies among the jurisdictions. At common law the right to contribution was not recognized, but many states have enacted
contribution statutes with widely varying effect. The UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION
AMONG ToRTFatsoas Act § 5 provides that. the settling tort-feasor may be liable
to the other tort-feasors for his fractional share of the judgment rendered against
them, less the consideration paid for the release. To date this Act has been
adopted in Arkansas, Delaware, Maryland, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, and South Dakota.
'Lysfjord v. Flintkote Co., 135 F. Supp. 672 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
'Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal.2d 705, 160 P.2d 783 (1945).
10See generally PRossER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 46.
E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5481; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.060 (1953). For
those states which have enacted the UNIFORM CONTRIBuToN AMONG TORTPEASORS
Acr § 4, see note 6 supra.
"-United States ex rel Marcus v. Hess, 154 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1946) ; McKenna
v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943) ; Lysfjord v. Flintkkote Co., 135 F. Supp.
672 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Rector v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 263
(S.D. Cal. 1952) ; Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N.Y. 455, 66 N.E. 133 (1903).
Shortt v. Hudson Supply & Equip. Co., 191 Va. 306, 60 S.E2d 900 (1950);
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With these varying attitudes among the several jurisdictions, a
problem arises where an injury occurs in one jurisdiction and a settlement is executed in another. Such a problem was presented in De Bono
v. Bittner.'3 The defendant, Bittner, a resider, of New York, was injured in an automobile accident in Virginia when struck head-on by
another motorist, also from New York, and immediately thereafter from
the rear by a Pennsylvania driver. Bittner and his two passengers, also
New York residents, settled their respective claims with the first driver.1 4
They executed general releases in favor of the driver while specifically
reserving their respective rights of action against all other joint tortfeasors. The settlement was executed in New York, the resident jurisdiction of all parties thereto, and apparently all were represented and
advised by New York counsel who addressed themselves to New York
law. Clearly such an instrument would be regarded in New York, by
judicial interpretation, not as a common law release but as a covenant
not to sue.15 In this case Bittner's two passengers sued him, alleging
that he was jointly liable with the first driver for their injuries. The
court, recognizing that the situation presented a case of first impression,
held that under Virginia law the instrument had the legal effect of a
common law release and was thus a bar to further recovery by the plaintiffs. Also recognizing that New York law was apparently contemplated in the execution of the "release" (and that therefore the parties
did not intend to extinguish their claims), the court nevertheless held
that the instrument was so related to the tort as to be a matter of substantive right' 6 and "that this [right to enforce a tort claim] must there17
fore be governed by the law of the situs of the tort."'
Bland v. Warwickshire Corp., 160 Va. 131, 168 S.E. 443 (1933).

v. Cheatham, 8 Wash. 2d 310, 111 P2d 1003 (1941)

Compare Haney

and Richardson v. Pacific

Power & Light Co., 11 Wash. 2d 288, 118 P.2d 985 (1941) zth Tucker v. Brown,
20 Wash. 2d 740, 150 P.2d 604 (1944). Pennsylvania apparently applied the pre-

sumption rule to all settlements prior to the enactment of

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,.

§ 2085 (Supp. 1958), in 1951, which incorporates the Uniform ContributionAmong
Tortfeasors Act. Sheppard v. Atlantic States Gas Co., 72 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Pa.
1947) ; Smith v. Roydhouse, Arey & Co., 244 Pa. 474, 90 Atl. 919 (1914). This
rule would seem to have been abrogated under the act. But compare Wilbert v.
Pittsburgh Consolidation Coal Co., 385 Pa. 149, 122 A.2d 406 (1956) with Caplan
v. Pittsburgh, 375 Pa. 268, 100 A.2d 380 (1953).
"313 Misc. 2d 333, 178 N.Y.S2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1958), aff'd mem. 10 App. Div.
2d 556, 196 N.Y.S2d 595 (1960).
" The settlements were actually made with the driver's estate, the driver being
fatally injured in the accident.
" Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N.Y. 455, 66 N.E. 133 (1903).
1" Plaintiff argued that the contract was independent of the tort, that the lex
fori should govern'. The court said that a release went to the very right to maintain a tort action and was consequently substantive in nature. While it did not
specifically so state, the court was apparently relying upon the concept embodied
in the Restatement, Conflict of Laws to the effect that in the enforcement of tort
claims, the law of the situs of the tort can govern the substantive rights of the
parties. See note 19 infra.
'17178 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
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Little,18

The same result was reached in Bittner v.
a case growing
out of the same accident involved in De Bono. The defendant in the
latter case was here suing the Pennsylvania driver in the federal district
court in that state. Thus the case was heard by a court sitting in a
jurisdiction connected with neither the situs of the tort nor the place of
settlement. Nevertheless, and in spite of the fact that the Pennsylvania
state court had never previously decided the issue, the court reached the
same result as that in De Bono and on much the same reasoning, apparently relying upon its interpretation of the Restatement, Conflict of
19

Laws.

It is significant that not once in the trial or appellate phases of either
of these cases did any court discuss another important aspect of the
conflict of laws problem, to wit: the lex loci contractus, the law of the
20
place of contracting, generally governs the construction of a contract.
While the lex loci delicti, the law of the tort situs, may determine the
rights of the parties as affected by a release or covenant, it does not seem
necessarily to follow that such jurisdiction's laws should govern the
construction of the instrument. Here the construction would involve
the determination of whether the instrument is a release or a covenant
not to sue. Certainly in this respect the law contemplated by the parties
(usually the lex loci contractus) should be paramount to the law of the
tort situs which, in these cases, is extremely fortuitous. It is submitted
that the rule applied in the above two cases constitutes an unwarranted
and unnecessary extension of the "vested rights" theory of the conflict of
laws. 2 ' It would seem that a more just result could be obtained if such
an instrument were construed in the light of the law under which it was
drawn.2 2 After the legal nature of the instrument had been thus ascer1 270 F2d 286 (3d Cir. 1959), afirming 168 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa. 1958).

19 The court cited Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 389 (1934) : "A liability to
pay damages for a tort can be discharged or modified by the law of the state which
created it." Quaere whether this or any other section of the Restatement makes
this an exclusive power of the tort situs.jurisdiction.
'0 As was mentioned in note 16 supra, the trial court in De Bono did discuss
the plaintiffs' contention that the lex fori should prevail, but even counsel apparently failed to couch his argument in terms of the law as contemplated by the
parties.
21 The so-called vested rights theory conceives that the law of the jurisdiction
wherein the injury occurs vests in the victim a right of action which he may
enforce in any appropriate forum but entirely subject to the law which gave him
the right. It is upon this theory that the appropriate sections of the Restatement
are predicated. See 2 BEALE, THE CoNFLICT OF LAWS §§ 378.1, .2, 389.1 (1935) ;
GOODRICH, CoNFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6-9 (1949) ; Ehrenzweig, Release of Concurrent
Tortfeasors in the Conflict of Laws, 46 VA. L. REv. 712 (1960). See generally
RESTATEMENT, CoNFLIcT OF LAws §§ 311-390 (1934).
" In Western Spring Serv. Co. v. Andrew, 229 F2d 413, 418 (10th Cir. 1956),
the court said in relation to a settlement in a multiple tort-feasor case: "These
contracts were made in Nebraska and would be controlled by the law of that state.
Whether they be construed as a release or a covenant not to sue . . . depends
tpon the intent of the parties since that is the controlling factor." Cf. Combined
Ins. Co. of America v. Bode, 247 Minn. 458, 77 N.W.2d 533 (1956). Unfortunately
the rule in the principal cases has been followed more often than not. See, e.g.,
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tained, its effect upon the rights of the parties to the tort action could
be determined by applying the lex loci delicti. In this way the laws of
the respective jurisdictions would receive their due weight in the determination of the overall effect of the settlement on the rights of the plain2
tiff and the tort-feasors. 3
Although it might not have altered the result in these two cases, due
to Virginia's isolated position on all tort settlements, the application of
this rule could make a very decisive difference in other jurisdictions. In
North Carolina, for example, covenants not to sue are recognized, but
great significance is attached to the technical form and language used in
the instrument. 24 Shapiro v. Embassy Dairy25 involved a situation
which was substantially similar to that in the two cases just discussed.
In this case the plaintiffs, New York residents, were injured in North
Carolina in a collision between the automobile in which they were riding
and the defendant's truck. Prior to this action they had settled with
their own driver, apparently also a New York resident. The settlement
was negotiated and executed in New York with an instrument, very like
the ones in De Bono and Bittner, which released the driver while specifically reserving the plaintiffs' rights against the other tort-feasors. 26
The federal district court which tried the case conceded that a "release"
with reservation of a right of action had never confronted the North
Carolina court, but it determined that this state would construe the
instrument to be an absolute release of all joint tort-feasors.2 7 And
Smith v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry., 194 Fed. 79 (8th Cir. 1912) ("the contract by

its terms is tied to the tort!'); Preine v. Freeman, 112 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Va.
1953) ; Goldstein v. Gilbert, 125 W. Va. 250, 23 S.E.2d 606 (1942).
" The question then might arise as to what law should govern the right of the
remaining tort-feasors to contribution from the one who settled. Since it is the
lex fori which ultimately creates any right to contribution that may exist, through
the rendering of a judgment against the tort-feasors, it would seem just and consistent to allow this law to control the creation and extent of such a right. This
seems particularly appropriate since this is a right which can never be affected
by any
agreement between the plaintiff and the settling tort-feasor.
2
Butler v. Norfolk So. Ry., 140 F. Supp. 601 (E.D.N.C. 1956).
"5112 F. Supp. 696 (E.D.N.C. 1953).
2 "I . . . remise, release and forever discharge the said Joseph J. Kirch [the
plaintiff's driver] and the Maryland Casualty Company [from any. claim] . . . I
ever had, now have or may have . . . upon or by reason of any matter, cause or
thing whatsoever from the beginning of the world to the day of the date of these
presents... . I hereby expressly reserve all my rights against Embassy Dairy,
Ins. [sic.] and/or Augustus B. Bunce, arising out of accident which occurred on
February 13, 1949, on U.S. Route 301, near Wilson, N. C." 112 F. Supp. at 697.
"' The federal district court claimed to find support for its conclusion by way
of a dictum in Howard v. Harris Plumbing Co., 154 N.C. 224, 227, 70 S.E. 285,
286 (1911), where the North Carolina Supreme Court quoted Judge Cooley:
"where the bar accrues in favor of some of the wrongdoers by reason of what has
been received from or done in respect to one or more others, . . . the bar arises
not from any particular form that the proceeding assumes, but from the fact that
the injured party has actually received satisfaction, or what in law is deemed the
equivalent. Therefore, if he accepts the satisfaction voluntarily made by one, that
is a bar to all. And so a release of one releases all, although the release expressly
stipulates that the other defendants shall not be released." There is no other

NORTH, CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

while acknowledging that under New York law the instrument would
be regarded as a covenant, the court nonetheless applied its version of
the North Carolina law to construe it as well as to determine its legal
effect upon the rights of the parties in the tort action. Again, this decision was based solely upon the reasoning that since North Carolina
was the situs of the tort its laws should govern all phases of the determination of the substantive rights in the tort action. Thus there
exists the anomaly of having one jurisdiction, which clearly recognizes
technical covenants not to sue, failing to give such effect to an instrument
which meets all of the requirements of a covenant in the jurisdiction in
which it was drawn and executed. This decision is objectionable for two
reasons. First, .it unduly extends the vested rights concept. Second, it
ignores the clear intentions and expectancies of the parties. The North
Carolina law, as pronounced by this court, continues to follow the
common-law rule of presuming complete satisfaction whenever the word
"release" appears in an instrument. If this be the true state of our law,
it is submitted that a statute ought to be enacted to require the courts
to look further than the mere technical form and language of an instrument in determining if it has been executed in exchange for complete
satisfaction.
It should be emphasized that an inflexible application of the le% loci
contractus in construing the instrument of settlement is no more to be
advocated than a similar application of the lex loci delicti. Certainly in
adopting a conflicts rule the courts should be guided as much by a desire
for flexibility to meet unusual situations as by the desire for uniformity
and certainty of result.28 It would seem, however, that the paramount
consideration should be what law the parties contemplated in executing
the settlement and release. Conceivably, a specific stipulation as to the
law intended by the parties to govern the transaction would be controlling unless such law were repugnant to the lex fori or the lex loci
delicti.29 Absent some clear indication of the governing law, the construction should be made with regard to the law of the jurisdiction which
has had the most significant contacts with the settlement and release.
In the instant'cases, as in most, this would be the lex loci contractus, 0
language in the Shapiro case to indicate that the court considered that the plaintiff
had received satisfaction in his settlement with the driver. In 1929, eighteen years

after the Howard case was decided, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-240 (1953) was amended
to allow contribution among tort-feasors. In view of this, quaere whether the
above quotation represents the law in North Carolina today.
11 COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWs 340-41
(1929).
" The choice of law should not be unlimited however; the law stipulated should
be that of a jurisdiction which has some significance with respect to the transaction.
See, e.g., Combined Ins. Co. of America v. Bode, 247 Minn. 458, 77 N.W.2d 533
(1956).
" Ironically, this approach has received its greatest support from the New
York courts. See, e.g., Smith v. American' Flange Mfg. Co., 139 F. Supp. 917
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In conclusion, it is submitted that any conflict of laws rule which
requires the application of a particular law irrespective of other relevant
factors is unsound. In a situation where a tort occurs in one jurisdiction and a partial settelment in another, the inflexible administration of
the lex loci delicti in the construction of the legal nature of the instrument of settlement will frequently work a substantial injustice through
the defeat of the plainly-expressed intent of the parties even where such
intent is not repugnant to the laws of either the forum or the situs of
the tort. This supremacy of the lex loci delicti, for which the courts
claim to find support in the Restatement, is nothing more nor less than
a sacricfice of justifiable flexibility for the sake of mere uniformity.
ALLAN W. MARKHAM

Demurrer Ore Tenus-Amendment-Relation Back.
In Stamey v. Rutherfordton Elec. Membership Corp.' the plaintiff
alleged separate causes of action for wrongful death and for pain and
suffering. The defendant answered, and the trial court sustained the
plaintiff's motion to strike several of the defenses alleged. On appeal
before the supreme court the defendant demurred ore tenus on the
ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action. The demurrer ore tenus was sustained without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to move for leave to amend.
Twenty-five months after the accident the plaintiff amended the complaint. The defendant demurred to the amended complaint on the
ground that the amendment constituted new matter and therefore was
barred by the statute of limitations. (The trial court sustained the demurrer. On appeal 2 the supreme court refused to allow the amendment
to relate back and held that the cause of action for wrongful death was
vulnerable to a proper plea of the statute of limitations.3
In many prior decisions the North Carolina court has classified a
plaintiff's complaint as either a "defective statement of a good cause of
action" or a "statement of a defective cause of action." 4 The court has
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) ; New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Stecker, 1 App.Div. 24 629, 1;2
N.Y.S2d 879 (1956); Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 13 Mise. 2d 8,
174 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. 1957); cf. Bierman v. Marcus, 140 F. Supp. 66 (1).
N.J. 1956).
1247 N.C. 640, 101 S.E.2d 814 (1958).
2 249 N.C. 90, 105 S.E.2d 282 (1958).
* Since the statute of limitations can never be taken advantage of by demurrer,
Lewis v. Shaver, 236 N.C. 510, 73 S.E2d 320 (1952), the court vacated the order
sustaining the demurrer and remanded the-cause.
' The substantive distinction between a defective statement of.a good ca'S2 and
a defective cause is discussed in 1 McINTOs H, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE & PROcEDauu
§ 1189, at 644 (2d ed. 1956). A good definition of the two terms is set out
in Davis "v.
Rhodes, 231 N.C. 71, 73, 56 S.E.2d 43, 45 (1949) : "When the defect
goes to the substance of the cause and not to the form of the statement, it is a
defective cause of action which cannot be made good by adding other allegations
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enunciated various rules with respect to these terms, and it appears that
the holding of the principal case on the first appeal is inconsistent with
these rules regardless of whether the plaintiff's complaint was in fact a
defective statement of a good cause or a statement of a defective cause.
All defects in a complaint except lack of jurisdiction over the subject
inatter and failure to state a cause of action are waived by the defendant
when he answers the complaint on the merits instead of demurring.
The rule that the defendant may object at any time for failure to state
a cause of action is not absolute. There are numerous decisions to the
effect that the ability to raise this objection ore tenus will depend upon
whether the complaint is a statement of a defective cause of action or a
defective statement of a good cause of action. 6 If the complaint is a
statement of a defective cause of action the objection is not waived and
a demurrer may be interposed at any time.7 However, a demurrer to
a defective statement of a good cause of action comes too late after
answer and should be overruled.8 Further, since the court has held that
a final judgment dismissing the action is mandatory where there is a
defective cause of action, 9 it follows a fortiori that an amendment should
be allowed only where there is a defective statement of a good cause of
action.
Thus, regardless of whether the complaint was in fact a defective
statement or a defective cause an inconsistency is present. If in fact the
complaint was a defective statement, though there is consistency in
allowing the amendment, there is inconsistency in the sustaining of the
demurrer. If in fact the complaint was a defective cause, though there
is consistency in sustaining the demurrer, there is inconsistency in allowing amendment.
not included in the original complaint. It is in no event, however expertly stated,
an enforceable cause of action....
"When, however, there is an enforceable cause of action stated but the statement thereof is inartificially expressed, or is in general terms, or the facts are not
clearly and definitely stated, or it is lacking in some material allegation, it constitutes a defective statement of a good cause...."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-134 (1953); City of Raleigh v. Hatcher, 220 N.C. 613,
18 S.E.2d 207 (1942) ; Schnibben v. Ballard & Ballard Co., 210 N.C. 193, 185 S.E.
646 (1936) ; Hitch v. Commissioners, 132 N.C. 573, 44 S.E. 30 (1903) ; Baker v.
Garris, 108 N.C. 218, 13 S.E. 2 (1891).
'Bailey v. McGill, 247 N.C. 286, 100 S.E.2d 860 (1957); Gurganus v. McLawhorn, 212 N.C. 397, 193 S.E. 844 (1937) ; Bader v. Garris, 108 N.C. 218, 13 S.E. 2
(1891) ; 1 MCINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRAMCE & PROCEDURE § 1194, at 653 (2d
ed. T1956).
Howze v. McCall, 249 N.C. 250, 106 S.E.2d 236 (1958) ; Hall v. Queen City
Coach Co., 224 N.C. 781, 32 S.E.2d 325 (1944).
'Johnson v. Graye, 251 N.C. 448, 111 S.E.2d 595 (1959) ; Davis v. Rhodes, 231
N.C. 71, 56 S.E.2d 43 (1949); Eddleman v. Lentz, 158 N.C. 65, 72 S.E. 1011
(1911) ; Garrison v. Williams, 150 N.C. 674, 64 S.E. 783 (1909).
"Mills v. Richardson, 240 N.C. 187, 81 S.E.2d 409 (1954). Accord, Adams v.
Flora Macdonald College, 247 N.C. 648, 101 S.E.2d 809 (1958) ; Burrell v. Dickson Transfer Co., 244 N.C. 662, 94 S.E.2d 829 (1956) ; Lindley v. Yeatman, 242
N.C. 145, 87 S.E.2d 5 (1955).
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In considering the effect of the plaintiff's amendment filed subsequent
to the decision on the first appeal, the court on the second appeal failed
to take notice of the rule that "if the amendment is germane to the original cause of action, deals with the same transaction, and does not introduce a new cause of action, it relates back to the commencement of the
action, and prevents the running of the statute of limitations . .

.,,"

In deciding whether or not the statute of limitations had run as to the
amended complaint the court did not consider the substantive content
of the amendment as this rule requires.", The court instead applied a
technical rule, enunciated by Webb v. Egglpston,'2 that when a demurrer for failure to state a cause of action is sustained, this becomes the
"law of the case"-that the original complaint did not state a cause of
action and that any amended complaint necessarily states a "new cause
of action." In applying the Webb case the court concluded that since
the "new cause of action" was filed after the running of the statute of
limitations it was barred by a proper plea of the statute.
In viewing the decisions of the court on both appeals, it appears that
an obvious inequity may result if they are followed. When the supreme
court sustains a demurrer ore tenus after answer, allows an amendment,
and then applies the "law of the case rule," it would seem that the
defendant is given an unwarranted advantage with respect to the running of the statute of limitations. A defendant with an attorney who
realizes the cause of action is defective and who has no compunction
about using delaying tactics can answer instead of filing a demurrer.
Should the jury return a verdict against him, the defendant can then
appeal the decision and demur ore tenus in the supreme court. Should
the court fail to apply the defective statement-defective cause rules requiring waiver or dismissal, and sustain the demurrer without prejudice to amend,1 3 the defendant will be able to set up the law of the case
rule. Thus, the defendant may be permitted to take his chances with
the jury and, upon losing, to delay the plaintiff out of court.
"0 McLaughlin v. Raleigh, C. & S. Ry., 174 N.C. 182, 186, 93 S.E. 748, 749
(1917). Accord, Ray v. French Broad Elec. Membership Corp., 252 N.C. 380, 113
S.E.2d 806 (1960); Picket v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. 153 N.C. 148, 69 S.E. 8

(1910).

" It might be noted that on the second appeal both attorneys argued whether
the amendment was germane and material. Nevertheless, the court refused to use
these criteria in deciding the issue. Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 9-12, Brief for Defendant, pp. 17-20, Stamey v. Rutherfordton Elec. Membership Corp., 249 N.C. 90,
105 S.E.2d 282 (1958).
228 N.C. 574, 46 S.E.2d 700 (1948).
18 This is basically what happened in Perkins v. Langdon, 231 N.C. 386, 57
S.E.2d 407 (1950). The defendant answered and verdict and judgment were for
the plaintiff. The defendant appealed the holding, demurred ore tenus, and his
demurrer was sustained without prejudice. However, the subsequent appeal on
the effect of the amendment was decided on the basis of whether the amendment
was germane and material. Perkins v. Langdon, 233 N.C. 240, 63 S.E.2d 565

(1951).
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It is not discernible when the court will or will not apply the defective statement-defective cause rules. It is apparent, however, that an
alert attorney should amend as early as possible after the sustaining of
a demurrer and not rely on relation back.1 4 Similarly, should he discover a defect in his complaint, he would be wise to amend and not to
rely on waiver.

H. MoRIusoN JOHNSTON, JR.
Food-Sales-Implied Warranty of Fitness for Human
Consumption.
In Adams v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co.' plaintiff purchaser of a
box of corn flakes sued defendant retailer for damages for breach of an
implied warranty. While eating the corn flakes plaintiff bit down on an
extremely hard object and broke off part of a tooth, the remainder of
which was subsequently extracted. Plaintiff alleged that the food, sold
in the original sealed container, was unwholesome and unfit for human
consumption. 2 A chemical analysis showed that the object causing the
harm was part of a grain of corn that had partially crystalized into a
state as hard as quartz. In affirming an involuntary nonsuit, the North
Carolina court held as a matter of law that the presence of the harmful
object was not a breach of the implied warranty. The court predicated
"' In the principal case the death occurred February 26, 1956; the defendant's
demurrer ore tenus was sustained January 31, 1958; and the plaintiff's attorney did
not ask leave to amend until March 7, 1958. If he had immediately moved for
leave to amend instead of relying upon relation back, he could have averted the
situation which defeated the cause of action for wrongful death.
1251 N.C. 565, 112 S.E.2d 92 (1960).
Where the article is sold for human consumption, the existence of the implied
warranty between vendee and his immediate vendor is firmly established in North
Carolina. Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E2d 822 (1951); Williams v.
Elson, 218 N.C. 157, 10 S.E.2d 668 (1940); Rabb v. Covington, 215 N.C. 572, 2
S.E.2d 705 (1939). See generally Note, 32 N.C.L. REv. 351 (1954).
It is not clear in North Carolina whether the vendee could sue the manufacturer
on implied warranty. An initial dictum stated that the manufacturer could be held
liable. Ward v. Morehead City Sea Food Co., 171 N.C. 33, 87 S.E. 958 (1916).
In Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard Co., 208 N.C. 1, 179 S.E. 30 (1935) the court
expressly rejected this theory for the reason that there was no contractual relation
between the manufacturer and the consumer to which implied warranty could
attach. This requirement of privity was followed in subsequent cases. Enloe v.
Charlotte Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 208 N.C. 305, 180 S.E. 582 (1935) ; Caudlc v.
F. M. Bohannon Tobacco Co., 220 N.C. 105, 16 S.E.2d 680 (1941). The present
trend in other jurisdictions is toward eliminating this requirement of privity. See
generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960);
Spruill, Privity of Contract as a Requisite for Recovery on Warranty, 19 N.C.L.
REv. 551 (1941).
Plaintiff may sue the manufacturer for negligence. Ward v. Morehead City
Seafood Co., supra. The value of the warranty action is that negligence need not
be proved, implied warranty being a form of liability without fault. Existence of
the warranty does not eliminate the necessity for proof that the product was defective when it left the manufacturer's hands. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Adams, 213 Md. 521, 132 A.2d 484 (1957). See generally DicxansoN, PRODUcTS
LIABILITY AND THE FooD CoNsuER §§ 2.15, 4.1 (1951) ; PRossER, TORTS § 84 (2d
ed. 1955).

1960]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

87

the decision on its finding that the harmful object was natural to the corn
flakes and that a consumer of the product should be expected to anticipate its presence.
This appears to be the first North Carolina decision on whether or
not the presence in food of a harmful substance natural to the product is
a breach of the implied warranty of fitness for human consumption. 3 In
similar cases other jurisdictions have differed as to both the test for
liability and the result obtained. As background for an analysis of
4
Adams some of those decisions from other states will be examined.
In Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co.5 plaintiff, while eating a chicken pie
in defendant's restaurant, was injured by a fragment of chicken bone.
On appeal defendant's demurrer was sustained, the court stating: "It
is sufficient if it may be said that as a matter of common knowledge
chicken pies occasionally contain chicken bones.... Bones which are
natural to the type of meat served cannot legitimately be called a foreign
substance, and a consumer who eats meat dishes ought to anticipate and
be on his guard against the presence of such bones." 6 The rationale of
Mix appears to be that food suppliers are not held to a standard of perfection and that consumers ought to anticipate the occasional presence
of substances which are natural constituents of the food even though
such substances are normally removed during preparation for consumption. This reasoning has been followed in a number of cases 7 where the
factual circumstances have been analogous to Mix.
"'The case is apparently one of first impression in North Carolina." Brief for
Appellee, p. 2. Compare Hanrahan v. Walgreen Co., 243 N.C. 268, 90 S.E2d 392
(1955), 34 N.C.L. Rxv. 394 (1956) (sale of hair rinse); Droughon v. Maddox,
237 N.C. 742, 75 S.E2d 917 (1953), 32 N.C.L. REv. 351 (1954) (sale of cow at
public auction); Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E.2d 822 (1951), 30 N.C.L.
REv. 191 (1952) (alleged poisonous ingredients in salt substitute); Walker v.
Hickory Packing Co., 220 N.C. 158, 16 S.E.2d 668 (1941) (spoiled and rancid
lard); Williams v. Elson, 218 N.C. 157, 10 S.E2d 668 (1940) (glass in sandwich) ;
Rabb v. Covington, 215 N.C. 572, 2 S.E2d 705 (1939) (metal in encased sausages).
'Both warranty and negligence cases are utilized in this discussion. The purpose of this note is to determine on what basis courts find food to be "unfit for
human consumption" due to the presence of some "natural object." A finding of
unfitness is essential to either action. On the similarities of the two actions, see
Bryer v. Rath Packing Co., 221 Md. 105, 156 A.2d 442 (1959); Hertzler v.
Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N.W. 155 (1924). See generally DicKERsoN,
PRoDucTs LIABILITY AND THE FooD CoNsuMER § 1.11 (1951); 2 HARPER & JAMES,
TORTS §28.22 (1956); PaossER, TORTS §84 (2d ed. 1955); 5 WiLLiSTON, CoxTRAcrs § 1505 (1937) ; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 Y,..E L.J. 1099

(1960).
6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936).

OId. at 681, 59 P.2d at 148.
1E.g., Shapiro v. Hotel Statler Corp., 132 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (fish
bone in "Hot Barquette of Seafood Mornay") ; Lamb v. Hill, 112 Cal. App. 2d.
41, 245 P.2d 316 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (splinter of bone in chicken pie) ; Norris
v. Pig'n Whistle Sandwich Shop, Inc., 79 Ga. App. 369, 53 S.E.2d 718 (1949)
(bone in barbecued pork sandwich) ; Goodwin v. Country Club, 323 Ill. App. 1, 54
N.E.2d 612 (1944) (turkey bone in creamed chicken) ; Brown v. Nebiker, 229 Iowa
1223, 296 N.W. 366 (1941) (bone fragment in pork chop). In Silva v. F. W.
Woolworth Co., 28 Cal. App. 2d 649, 83 P2d 76 (Dist. Ct. App. 1938) (turkey
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Other cases, however, have placed less reliance on the naturalness
of the object as a test in. itself, but instead have determined liability by
looking at the nature of the final product, the circumstances normally
surrounding its consumption and the customary habits and common
knowledge of mankind.8 The test applied in these cases is what the
average consumer could reasonably expect to find in his food. Thus in
Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp.9 the court reversed a dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint which was based on the presence of a sliver of chicken bone
in a chicken sandwich. Discussing Mix at length, the opinion stated:
Naturalness of the substance to any ingredients in the food
served is important only in determining whether the consumer
may reasonably expect to find such substance in the particular
type of dish or style of food served.... The test should be what
is reasonably expected by the consumer in the food as served, not
what might be natural to the ingredients of that food prior to
preparation. 10
Adams appears to follow the rationale of Mix." Assuming that the
substance was natural to the corn flakes, the holding is consistent with
other cases following MiX.' 2 The validity of the court's assumption" of
bone in roast turkey and dressing), the court cited Mix as controlling. The
opinion stated that the criterion for determining liability was whether the object
causing the injury was foreign;. this apparently disregards part of the Mix rationale,
but under the facts the result follows Mix.
8
E.g., Bryer v. Rath Packing Co., 221 Md. 105, 156 A.2d 442 1959) (chicken
bone in chow mein prepared from "ready to serve boned chicken'); Lore v. De
Simone Bros., 172 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (fragment of bone in salami) ;
Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167 (1960) (oyster shell in fried
oysters); Wood v. Waldorf Sys., Inc., 79 R.I. 1, 83 A.2d 90 (1951) (fragment
of bone in chicken soup) ; Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d
64 (1960) (sliver of bone in chicken sandwich). In Wieland v. C. A. Swanson
& Sons, 223 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862 (1955), the court held
that whole chicken bones are anticipated in packaged chicken cut up for fricassee,
and that therefore they could not be the basis for liability; the court indicated that
bone slivers in the same product would sustain an action. While Lore, supra, and
Wood, supra, discuss the issue in terms of the naturalness of the object, they
clearly have departed from the Mix rationale, as they hold that fragments of bone
natural to meat are not natural to the final products involved.
'10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960).
" Id.at -, 103 N.W.2d at 67, 69. Compare Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St.
249, 258-59, 164 N.E2d 167, 174 (1960) : "However, the fact, that something that
is served with food and that will cause harm if eaten is natural to that food and
is not a 'foreign substance' will usually be an important factor in determining
whether a consumer can reasonably anticipate and guard against it."
"1
The opinion cites with apparent approval the Mix case and most of the cases
which have followed Mix.
1 These cases have uniformly decided the issue of liability as a matter of law.
E.g., Shapiro v. Hotel Statler Corp., 132 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (fish bone
in seafood); Norris v. Pig'n Whistle Sandwich Shop, Inc., 79 Ga. App. 369, 53
S.E.2d 718 (1949) (bone in barbecued pork sandwich) ; Goodwin v. Country Club,
323 I1. App. 1, 54 N.E.2d 612 (1944) (turkey bone in creamed chicken) ; Brown
v. Nebiker, 229 Iowa 1223, 296 N.W. 366 (1941) (bone fragment in pork chop).
Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167 (1960), expressly rejected the
Mix doctrine but looking at all the circumstances decided as a matter of law that a
piece of oyster shell in fried oysters is to be anticipated.
1" The opinion at the outset stated that "Plaintiff's case is based upon the pres-
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naturalness is, however, open to question. It is arguable that the "metamorphosis" undergone by the grain of corn in the process of its preparation changed its character in such a way that it was no longer natural
to either corn or corn flakes. This crystalized grain is distinguishable
from bones, oyster shells, cherry pits and other substances which,
although not removed from food, retain their original composition and
characteristics. In Adams there was certainly a basic change in the
corn. The finely processed nature of the final product in Adams, the
changed character of the particle of corn, and the manufacturer's claims
as to the fitness of his product as a breakfast food for children cast doubt
upon the soundness of the court's finding as a matter of law that the
object was "natural" to the corn flakes.14
In Giinenez v. Great AtL. & Pac. Tea Co., 5 a case analagous to
Adams, the plaintiff's stomach was lacerated as a result of eating canned
crab meat which contained stone-like, jagged, struvite crystals. These
crystals had formed subsequent to canning by a union of the chemicals
found in the natural juices of the meat. On appeal plaintiff's recovery
for breach of implied warranty was sustained, the New York court
finding that the crystals were "dangerous" and "deleterious." Neither
the appellate division nor the court of appeals stated whether the crystals
were natural or foreign.' 6 The variance in result from that in Adams
would seem to lie in the difference in rationale since the New York
court did not look to the test of naturalness.'
As contrasted with the
preparation of meat, seafood, poultry, and fruit dishes, Adams and
Gimenez18 are instances where it is contemplated that the entire ingredient will be made suitable for human consumption by a system of processing. Whenever the processing creates changes in the condition of the
ingredient so as to make the food in fact harmful, naturalness would
seem to have little bearing on fitness for human consumption.
If North Carolina had followed the reasoning of some of the more
recent cases, the result obtained in Adams might have been reached
ence in the corn flakes . . . of a substance natural to the corn flakes, and not
removed thereform in the process of its preparation for human consumption..
His is not a case of a foreign object .

.

. "

251 N.C. at 566-67, 112 S.E.2d at 94.

",Would the manufacturer, if joined, have contended that the object was natural to the product and was to be anticipated and guarded against by the average
consumer?
240 App. Div. 238, 269 N.Y.S. 463, aff'd, 264 N.Y. 390, 191 N.E. 27 (1934).
Plaintiffs complaint was framed on the theory that the product contained a
deleterious substance other than crab meat.
" It is not clear what specific legal principles the court applied to determine liability but it is doubtful that the decision resttd on the consumer-expectation approach.

"8Bones were not involved in the Gitenez case.
canned, was expected to be eaten.

The entire crab meat, as
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without the questionable finding on the naturalness of the object. 19 The
court in its estimation of common knowledge might have held as a matter of law that one who eats corn flakes should anticipate the presence
of an occasional hard object derived from corn.20 However, it is equally
conceivable that the court would have left the question of reasonable fit21
ness to the jury.
The present trend is toward using naturalness as only one factor
among others in order to determine what the consumer should expect.
Other jurisdictions have rejected the limitations of the Mix rule with
or without factual distinctions from the Mix case. Adams is factually
more distinguishable from Mix than the other holdings which follow its
rationale. It is submitted that reliance upon the consumer-expectation
rationale would provide a sounder basis for determining liability in future cases arising in this area.
JorHN H. P. HELMS
Res Judicata-Consent Judgment in Favor of Infant as Bar to
Litigation Between Joint Tortfeasors.
In Pack v. McCoy' the plaintiff brought suit to recover for his personal injuries and property damage arising out of a motorcycle-bus collision. Plaintiff was the operator of the motorcycle and defendants were
the bus driver and the bus company. In a previous personal injury
action a bus passenger, an infant, had sued the bus company, the bus
driver, and the motorcycle operator as joint tort-feasors. The infant's
suit was settled by a consent judgment entered in her favor against all
defendants. The defendants in Pack pleaded res judicata, asserting
that the prior judgment was a final adjudication of the issue of negligence between the present parties. The supreme court reversed the trial
2
court's order striking the defense.
" Naturalness would be relevant in some cases, but in others this test properly
could be omitted and the decision placed on what the consumer should expect, with
other criteria determining the issue.

2' See Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167 (1960), where the
court took the case from the jury on the ground that common knowledge requires
that consumers of fried oysters anticipate the presence therein of an occasional
piece of oyster shell.

2' In most of the recent cases which have used "naturalness" only in conjunction with other criteria, the question of reasonable fitness has been left to the jury.
E.g., Bryer v. Rath Packing Co., 221 Md. 105, 156 A.2d 442 (1959); Lore v.
De Simone Bros., 172 N.Y.S2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Wood v. Waldorf Sys.,
Inc., 79 R.I. 1, 83 A2d 90 (1951); Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323,
.103 N.W.2d 64 (1960). Contra, Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E2d
167 (1960).
1251 N.C. 590, 112 S.E2d 118 (1959).
-There
was a dissent. Judge Bobbitt (Judge Parker joining) thought there
had not been an adjudication of the negligence between the former defendants, that

the defense should not be allowed, and that precedents to the contrary should be
over-ruled. 251 N.C. at 593, 112 S.E.2d at 121.

1960]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

91

Two defendants may settle a plaintiff's claim out of court, and this
settlement will not be res judicata as to their rights and liabilities inter
sa if they subsequently litigate their own claims.3 Also, a plaintiff's
voluntary non-suit taken after an extra-judicial settlement of his claim
will not bar future litigation between the original defendants. 4 But if
the plaintiff in the original action happens to be an infant, the present
decision indicates that the necessary court approval of the settlement, 5
as evidenced by the consent judgment, will bar any further action between the former defendants.
In the principal case the court expressly relied on Lumberton Coach
Co. v. Stone, which held that a previous consent judgment in favor of
an adult plaintiff barred a suit between the former defendants. In following this precedent the court adhered to the rule that '-'a judgment
for the plaintiff against two or more defendants charged with joint and
concurrent negligence establishes their negligence and may be pleaded
in bar by one defendant against the other in a subsequent action between
them based on the negligent acts at issue in the first cause." It is true
that in a subsequent suit between the defendants to collect contribution
8
the issue of the defendants' negligence to the plaintiff is res judicata.
This situation, however, is clearly distinguishable from that presented
in either Lumberton Coach Co. or the principal case. In the latter two
instances the second action is based upon the damage allegedly caused
one defendant by the negligence of the other, and the recovery sought is
not a pro rata share of the damages owed the original plaintiff but the
damages sustained by the former defendant himself.
Since North Carolina holds that a consent judgment in favor of the
plaintiff constitutes res judicata in any later action between the defendants, it would seem to follow that a judgment on the merits in the first
suit would bar the subsequent action. Where the first action has resulted in a verdict on the merits, the great majority of courts hold that
a second action (between the original defendants) is not barred by the
first judgment.9 This is true in all jurisdictions except New York,
'Penn Dixie Lines, Inc. v. Grannick, 238 N.C. 552, 78 S.E.2d 410 (1953).

'Mercer v. Hilliard, 249 N.C. 725, 107 S.E,2d 554 (1959).
An infant's contract may be avoided. Chandler v. Jones, 172 N.C. 569, 90
S.E. 580 (1916). Thus it is necessary that a court pass on any settlement where a
party is a minor. Where the judgment recites an investigation by the court and
a finding that the compromise is just, the judgment is binding in the absence of

fraud. Oates v. The Texas Co., 203 N.C. 474, 166 S.E. 317 (1932).
"235 N.C. 619, 70 S.E.2d 673 (1952).
7251 N.C. at 593, 112 S.E.2d at 120.
'Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-240 (1953), each defendant found to be a joint

tortfeasor is liable to the plaintiff for a proportionate amount of the judgment rendered; if any defendant pays more than his proportionate part, he can obtain con-

tribution from the other joint tortfeasors.

'E.g., Hellenic Lines v. The Exmouth, 253 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Kimmel v.
Yankee Lines, 224 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1955) ; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Dowdell, 109 So. 2d 151 (Ala. 1959) ; Casey v. Balunas, 19 Conn. Supp. 365, 113
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where the decisions are in conflict.
The majority of courts" reason
that in the first suit the co-defendants were not adverse parties and their
rights and liabilities as between themselves were not put in issue nor
litigated. 1 2 Where the co-defendants were actually adverse parties in
the first suit and the issue of their negligence to each other was litigated,
the judgment rendered therein will act as a bar to further litigation
between them. 13 In North Carolina where the defendants are joined in
the first suit they could never be true adverse parties since our court
has held that one defendant may not cross claim another in an action
where the plaintiff has sued both as joint tortfeasors.' 4 Since the issue
of negligence as between the defendants cannot properly be adjudicated
in the first suit, the judgment should not be res judicata as to such
negligence.
In the principal case the consent judgment appears to be the result
of a friendly suit to facilitate the settlement of the infant's claims."
The North Carolina court has said, "The law favors the settlement of
controversies out of court."' 6 It is submitted that settlements in court
should also be encouraged. The court should recognize, as it has in the
A.2d 867 (1955); Clark's Adm'x v. Rucker, 258 S.W.2d 9 (Ky. 1953); Bunge v.
Yager, 236 Minn. 245, 52 N.W.2d 446 (1952); Boston & M.R.R. v. Sargent, 72
N.H. 455, 57 Atl. 688 (1904); Wiles v. Young, 167 Tenn. 224, 68 S.W.2d 114
(1934) ; Ray v. Consolidated Freightways, 4 Utah 2d 137, 289 P.2d 196 (1955) ;
Byrum v. Ames & Webb, Inc., 196 Va. 597, 85 S.E.2d 364 (1955). A fortiori a
consent judgment would not bar the second action.
10 Holding that the prior suit is not res judicata are Israel v. Krupa, 180 Misc.
995, 43 N.Y.S.2d 113 (Sup. Ct. 1943) ; Glasser v. Huette, 232 App. Div. 119, 249
N.Y.S. 374 aff'd mtem. 256 N.Y. 686, 177 N.E. 193 (1931). For cases contra, see
Moyle v. Cronin, 189 N.Y.S.2d 96 (Broome County Ct. 1959); James v. Saul, 184
N.Y.S.2d 934 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1958).
"The North Carolina court is in the minority and admits, "It must be conceded, however, there is authority in conflict with . . .Lwnberton Coach Co. v.
Stone... However, adhering to our rule, we conclude the trial court committed
error in striking the further defense." 251 N.C. at 593, 112 S.E.2d at 121.
1" "The rendition of a judgment in an action does not conclude parties to the
action who are not adversaries under the pleadings as to their rights inter se upon
matters which they did not litigate, or have an opportunity to litigate, between
themselves." RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 82 (1942) (often quoted in majority
opinions).

" Vaughn's Adm'r v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 297 Ky. 309, 179 S.W.2d 441
(1944); accord, Simodejka v. Williams, 360 Pa. 332, 62 A.2d 17 (1948). See
generally the dissenting opinion by Clark, J., in Hellenic Lines v. The Exmouth,
253 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1957) (the majority held the defendants not to be adverse
parties in the first suit).
1" Bell v. Lacey, 248 N.C. 703, 104 S.E2d 833 (1958) ; Clark v. Pilot Freight
Carriers, Inc., 247 N.C. 705, 102 S.E.2d 252 (1958). But where one defendant
has another brought in for purposes of contribution, the second defendant may cross
claim against the original defendant for his own injuries or property damage.
Norris v. Johnson, 246 N.C. 179, 97 S.E.2d 773 (1957).
Brief for Appellee, pp. 2-3, Pack v. McCoy, 251 N.C. 590, 112 S.E.2d 118
(1959).
" Penn Dixie Lines, Inc. v. Grannick, 238 N.C. 552, 555, 78 S.E.2d 410, 413

(1953).
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past,17 that a consent judgment merely evidences the agreement of the
parties and is not an adjudication of negligence.
In view of Pack it seems almost impossible in North Carolina for two
parties to settle a third-party-infant's claim and at the same time protect
their right to litigate the issue of damages between themselves. Either
the out-of-court settlement with the infant will be open to later disaffirmance, or the in-court settlement will bar future litigation between
the defendants.' 8 There is a possibility of a separate consent judgment
in favor of the infant against each of the defendants, as an injured party
may sue one or all joint tortfeasors.' 9 It is submitted that it should not
be necessary to use this cumbersome and uncertain procedure. The
writer believes that the North Carolina court should follow the reasoning
of the dissent in Pack, which would allow all parties to a controversy to
litigate their claims while at the same time encouraging the settlement of
suits by an infant.
CEARLES E. DAMERON III
Rule Against Perpetuities-Commercial Leases.
A leasehold to commence after the completion of a building was declared void ab initio by the California District Court of Appeals in the
recent case of Haggerty v. City of Oakland' as a violation of the rule
against perpetuities. 2 The City of Oaldand and one Goodman entered
into a written contract whereby the city was to build a building and
lease it to Goodman for a term of years. The term was not to commence until the first day of the second month after completion of the
building. The lease contained no specified date for beginning construction on the building but did provide that the city "shall and will in good
faith immediately after the execution of this lease proceed with plans for
"The North Carolina Supreme Court, in holding an Ohio divorce decree not
to be a consent judgment, stated, "A judgment by consent is the agreement of the
parties.... It is not a judicial determination of the rights of the parties and does
not purport to represent the judgment of the court, but merely records the preexisting agreement of the parties." McRary v. McRary, 228 N.C. 714, 719, 47
S.E.2d 27, 31 (1948).
" The holding in the principal case does not apply to actions involving a contract. Stanley v. Parker, 207 N.C. 159, 176 S.E. 279 (1934).
" Denny v. Coleman, 245 N.C. 90, 95 S.E.2d 352 (1956) ; Charnock v. Taylor,
223 N.C. 360, 26 S.E.2d 911 (1943). Since there can be only one recovery for
an injury, satisfaction of the infant's first consent judgment would bar a suit
against the second tortfeasor. Bell v. Hawkins, 249 N.C. 199, 105 S.E.2d 642
(1958). Likewise, a release of one tortfeasor will bar an action against the other.
King v. Powell, 220 N.C. 511, 17 S.E.2d 659 (1942); Smith v. Thompson, 210
N.C. 672, 188 S.E. 395 (1936).
1161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P.2d 957 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
' Dallapi v. Campbell, 45 Cal. App. 2d 541, 114 P.2d 646 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941);
Spicer v. Moss, 409 II. 343, 100 N.E.2d 761 (1951) ; Johnson v. Preston, 226 I11.
447, 80 N.E. 1001 (1907); McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C.
737, 68 S.E.2d 831 (1952).
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the construction ... and shall thereafter prosecute the same to completion with all due diligence." (Emphasis added.)
Haggerty, taxpayer of the City of Oakland, brought suit to have the
lease declared void, inter alia, on grounds that it violated the common
law rule against perpetuities4 as embodied in a California statute. The
court so held, reasoning that since there was an uncertain and unfixed
commencement date for the lease, a possibility existed that the estate
might not vest within twenty one years. This holding reflects generations of judicial adherence to the rule against perpetuities.
The classic definition of the rule against perpetuities, as stated by
Gray, 6 is as follows: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all,
not later than twenty one years after some life in being at the creation
of the interest." Basically the rule is one invalidating interests which
vest too remotely, so that postponement of possession or enjoyment is
not affected.7 If the time of the commencement of the interest is indefinite, then the rule applies.8 It is not a rule of construction but a
positive mandate of law to be obeyed irrespective of intention and to
be applied even if accomplishment of the expressed intent of the grantor
is made impossible thereby.9
The ultimate purpose of the rule is to prevent the tying up of the
title to real property and to facilitate the use of land in commerce.10
Thus the rule concerns rights in real property only and does not affect
the making of contracts which do not create such rights."1 The authorities are in conflict as to whether a lease is a contract, a conveyance, or
a conveyance with contractual obligations superimposed. 12 However
' 161 Cal. App. 2d at -, 326 P.2d at 966.
'If the time within which a contingency must occur is not annexed to a life
in being, the period allowed for vesting is twenty one years from the interest's
creation. See Estate of McCollum, 43 Cal. App. 2d 313, 110 P.2d 721 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1941) ; Smith v. Renne, 382 Ill. 26, 46 N.E.2d 587 (1943) ; Leach, Perpetuities

in a Nutshell, 51 HAiv. L. Rav. 638 (1938).

' CAL. Crv. ConE § 7152: "No interest in real or personal property shall be
good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty one years after some life
in being at the creation of the interest.. . . It is intended by the enactment of
this section to make effective in this State the American common-law rule against

perpetuities"
8

TH E RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942).
McEwen v. Enoch, 167 Kan. 119, 204 P.2d 736 (1949) ; Forbringer v. Romao,
GRAY,

10 N.J. Super. 175, 76 A2d 825 (Ap. Div. 1950) ; McQueen v. Branch Bankihg
& Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E2d 831 (1952).
1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 268 (Abr. ed. 1940) and cases there cited.
'Emerson v. Campbell, 32 Del. Ch. 178, 84 A.2d 148 (1951) ; Monarski v. Greb,
407 Il. 281, 95 N.E.2d 433 (1950) ; Mercer v. Mercer, 230 N.C. 101, 52 S.E.2d 229
(1949)
; Crockett v. Scott, 199 Tenn. 90, 284 S.W2d 289 (1955).
1
oGRAY, TIIE RuLE AGAINST PEUETUITIES §§ 1 4, 235 (4th ed. 1942).
Todd v. Citizens' Gas Co., 46 F2d 855 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 852
(1931); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Purcell, 244 S.W.2d 458 (Ky. 1951);.
First Nat'l Bank v. Gideon-Broh Realty Co., 139 W. Va. 130, 79 S.E.2d 675
(1953) ; West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal

46 (1947).

Co.

v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S.E.2d

See generally 25 N.C.L. Rnv. 516 (1946).
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the lease be classified in legal theory, if in fact it does create definite
rights in realty, then it must follow that the rule against perpetuities
applies. There seem to be relatively few cases discussing the rule as
applied to leases in futuro'3 but the leading text-writers agree14 that
no legally defined interest is vested and that, if a lease of a term for
years is to take effect on a condition precedent which may not occur
within the period of the rule, it -violates the rule and must fall.
There was a strong dissent in Haggerty based upon the proposition
that, under modem conditions and concepts, there could be no question
of the lease's failure to vest in interest within twenty one years. The
dissent said, "To hold that under modem economic conditions there is
even a bare possibility that a landlord and tenant ... would ever wait
over twenty one years for their lease to take effect is unrealistic, fantastic and even absurd."' 1 Rather, the dissent chose to emphasize the
"reasonable performance" feature of the lease agreement. The dissenting judge would have followed an accepted rule of the law of contracts
and allowed the court to construe the phrase "with all due diligence" as
requiring performance within a "reasonable time."' 6
At first blush this seems to be the logical solution, but as the majority
points out, "This argument is deceptively simple, and is unsound."' 7
Had the language of the instrument in the principal case been such as
to create a lease in prasent '8s then the argument of the dissent would
have been in point. The lessee would have had a present right of possession in the property, and the construction provision would have been
an incidental part of the lease. In a proper action the court could enforce this contractual part of the lease agreement by determining what
would be a "reasonable time"'19 for completion of the building. No case
has been found, however, where such concepts of contract law have been
applied in resolving the question of when the lease vests an interest in
the lessee.
"8This note is dealing with a specific type of commercial interest, a lease limited
to commence in futuro, and does not explore the whole field of future interests to
which
the rule against perpetuities is applicable.
4
" GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PamPETurriEs § 320.1 (4th ed. 1942) ; 3 SimEs &
SmiTH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1242 (2d ed. 1956); 2 TIFFANY, REAL PoPERT"
§406 (3rd ed. 1939).
" 161 Cal. App. 2d at - , 326 P.2d at 967-68.
" 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 360 (1939).
1 161 Cal. App. 2d at - , 326 P.2d at 966.
"'A grant in prasenti imports a transfer, subject to the limitations mentioned,
of a present possessory interest in the lands designated.
106 U.S. 360 (1882).

Van Wych v. Knevals,

19 E.g., Florence Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Hanby, 101 Ala. 15, 13 So.
343 (1893), contract to erect an electric light plant "as soon as possible"; Stark

v. Shaw, 155 Cal. App. 2d 171, 317 P.2d 182 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957), cert. denied,

356 U.S. 937 (1958), where contract for roofing houses contained no commencement date, but it was held that a promise to perform within a reasonable time
was implied; Western Land Roller Co. v. Schumacher, 151 Neb. 166, 36 N.W.2d
777 (1949), a contract to complete a well and install pump "as quickly as possible."
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The decision in the principal case has been criticized as hampering
land development under current commercial conditions.20 The parties
clearly contemplated the active use of the land for purposes beneficial
both to themselves and to the public generally. 21 Consequently the
point has been made that the rule against perpetuities-itself aimed at
freeing the use of land for such purposes-has here been so applied as
to do just the opposite. 22 This view seems to attach more importance
to the execution of commercial agreements than to the settlement of
outstanding interests in land. The same sentiment is expressed by the
dissent, which finds some support from Simes & Smith. 23 The latter
authority, however, in turn rests upon three cases where the facts are
clearly distinguishable. 24 Each of these cases involved a trust, the subject matter of which was currently in existence. In Haggerty the
subject of the lease was only a contemplated building which might never
come into existence. If the lessor-builder experienced hardship and
could not perform, the lessee might insist upon "standing on his rights"
under the lease, take no legal action whatsoever, but refuse to dissolve
the contract. Should the lessor later desire to convey the land which
the building was to occupy, his prospective purchaser could reasonably
object that the title was encumbered.2 5 Thus it can be seen how realty
2o 47
I FL.
REv. 197 (1959) ; 73 HARv. L. REv. 1318 (1960) ; 10 HAsTINs
L.J. 439 (1959); 6 U.C.L.A.L. Ray. 165 (1959). The editor in 35 N.D.L. REV.
170 (1959) favored the majority decision. In a brief comment on the case, the
editor in 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 401 (1960) finds no fault with the result. He points
out to be safe this type of lease should have a provision for completion which
complies with the rule, but he describes both the majority and dissent as "wellreasoned opinions."
2" "Haggerty and the city were obviously both satisfied with the arrangement,
so the city constructed the building and the management company is now operating
it under a slightly changed arrangement. The only losses, apart from Haggerty's,
are the professional reputation of the municipal attorney who drafted the instrument
(1960).and the lessee's attorney who accepted it." 73 HAuv. L. Ray. 1318, 1323
-( Commentary
cited note
20 supra.

SIMS & SMITH, FUTURE INaREST § 1228 (2d ed. 1956). The author
states: "Occasionally one finds cases where vesting is, in effect, to take place 'in
a reasonable time,' and the court sometimes presumes that a reasonable time will
necessarily be within twenty-one years. If, in light of the surrounding circumstances, as a matter of construction, 'a reasonable time' is necessarily less than
twenty-one years, then such holdings are not subject to criticism." 3 SIMEs &
SMITH, op. cit. supra at 122.
" See Brandenburg v. Thorndike, 139 Mass. 102, 28 N.E. 575 (1885), where
trustees were to make gift effective three years after wife's death, or at such time,
earlier or later, as in their discretion would be expedient and practicable for settlement of the estate; Plummer v. Brown, 315 Mo. 627, 287 S.W. 316 (1926), where
trustees were to sell and distribute trust when it could be done to advantage and
without injury to the estate or beneficiaries; West Texas Bank & Trust Co. v.
Matlock, 212 S.W. 937 (Tex. Com. App. 1919), where trust was created to pay
a bonus to the first railroad passing through certain property within a reasonable
time.
"2It is not altogether clear what interests or rights the would-be lessee does have
under a lease it; futuro, but it has been suggested that by the common law he
would have an interesse termini. And this is only a right to an estate at best, a
203

mere interest in the term.

TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 68 (Abr. ed. 1940).
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might become tied up for an indefinite period of time. In such a situation the rule against perpetuities provides the obvious solution, dissolving any rights the lessee might have had.
While the precise issue litigated in the principal case appears never
to have been before the North Carolina Supreme Court, there are indications that our court would reach the same result. The common law
rule against perpetuities is recognized and enforced in this state.2 6 A
fact situation similar to that in the principal case was before the North
Carolina court in Manufacturing Co. v. Hobbs.27 The action at the
trial level was conducted altogether on a question of fact as to whether
fraud had been committed by the plaintiff in inducing the contract. 28
The contract was for the sale of timber and contained a provision which
allowed the plaintiff "the full term of five years within which to cut and
remove the timber hereby conveyed, said term to commence from the
time said party of the second part begins to manufacture said timber
into wood or lumber."2 9 The court did not comment on the fraud issue
but simply stated that "there is on the face of the pleadings an insuperable obstacle to recovery on the part of the plaintiff .... 30 This obstacle was the fact that the interest might never become vested. That
the court had in mind a violation of the rule against perpetuities appears
obvious from a portion of the opinion which states, "It is evident from
the reading of the contract that the fee in the land was not to pass, and
yet no one can tell how long the land and other timber upon it may remain useless to the defendants and to the Commonwealth under the indefinite and uncertain time at which the lease is to begin.'
This statement of the court sums up the necessity for the majority
decision in the principal case. Without a clear holding that the lease
violates the rule against perpetuities, the land might be tied up indefinitely. It is submitted that courts in North Carolina, if faced with a
similar issue, would be on firm ground in following the majority in
Haggerty. To insure the validity of commercial leases of the type herein
discussed, it would seem advisable for the draftsmen always to insert a
saving clause in such leases. This clause should state that "if the completion of the building takes more than twenty years, then this lease and
contract are to be null and void." While such leases are not entirely
new to the business world,3 2 they are used much more frequently in
" Mercer v. Mercer, 230 N.C. 101, 52 S.E.2d 229 (1949). See also N.C.
I, § 31: "Perpetuities ... ought not to be allowed."
27 128 N.C. 46, 38 S.E. 26 (1901).
2'"
Id. at 47, 38 S.E. at 26.
-' Ibid.
30
Ibid.
1
Id.at 48, 38 S.E. at 26.
"An agreement to build and lease a garage, construction to start at once, was
the commercial transaction in the not too recent case of Monger v. Lutterloh, 195
N.C. 274, 142 S.E. 12 (1928).
CONST. art.
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this era of supermarkets and shopping centers; and under the holding

of the principal case, they are certainly of questionable validity without
such a saving clause.
C. EDWIN ALLMAN, JR

Specific Performance-Oral Contracts to DeviseStatute of Frauds.
In a recent Kentucky decision,' an illegitimate daughter brought suit
against her father's estate on his oral promise to devise real property to
her in consideration of her mother's foregoing the institution of bastardy
proceedings against him. The trial court held the oral contract unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, but awarded damages on the
basis of quantum wieruit, measured by the value of the property promised
to be devised. On appeal, the court of appeals remanded with directions to enter a decree for specific performance of the contract if the
property was still vested in the heirs of the decedent and still available
for transfer to the plaintiff.
Uniformly, it is held that oral contracts to devise realty are within
the section of Statute of Frauds relating to contracts for the transfer

of real property.2 However, the majority of jurisdictions will grant

specific performance of the contract on the theory of part performance
where there has been a performance by the promisee which is incapable
of monetary evaluation. 3 The rationale of these courts is that the Statute
of Frauds, which was designed to prevent fraud, should not be used to
perpetuate a fraud and that the equity of the promisee who has performed
in reliance upon the oral contract requires the specific deliverance of the
4
thing promised.
Prior to the decision in the principal case Kentucky had repudiated
the doctrine of part performance as taking the oral contract out of the
'Miller
v. Miller, 335 S.W2d 884 (Ky. 1960).
2
E.g., Pocius v. Fleck, 13 Ill. 2d 420, 150 N.E2d 106 (1958); Griggs v. Oak,
164 Neb. 296, 82 N.W.2d 410 (1957); Gales v. Smith, 249 N.C. 263, 106 S.E.2d
164 (1958); Hill v. Luck, 201 Va. 586, 112 S.E2d 858 (1960); 49 Am. JUn.
Statute of Frauds §215 (1943).
'Jones v. Adams, 67 Idaho 402, 182 P2d 963 (1947) ; Jatcko v. Hoppe, 7 Ill. 2d
479, 131 N.E.2d 84 (1956); Betterly v. Granger, 350 Mich. 651, 87 N.W.2d 330
(1957); Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P.2d 480 (1956) ;
Patton v. Patton, 201 Va. 705, 112 S.E2d 849 (1960). The courts have varied
widely in terminology and in description of the particular acts necessary to take
the oral contract out of the statute. See Parker v. Solomon, 171 Cal. App. 2d
125, 340 P.2d 353 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (equitable estoppel) ; Hurd v. Ball, 128
Ind. App. 278, 143 N.E.2d 458 (1957) (fraud). See generally Annot., 101 A.L.R.
923 (1936); Comment, 36 U. DET. LJ. 316 (1959).
' Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950) ; Anselmo v. Beardmore, 70 Idaho 392, 219 P.2d 946 (1950) ; Gladville v. McDole, 247 Ill. 34, 93 N.E.
86 (1910); Gossett v. Harris, 48 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
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Statute.5 North Carolina," Mississippi 7 and Tennessee8 have also rejected the doctrine of part performance. The question -arises whether
the reasoning used by the Kentucky court in reversing its position would
be persuasive if and when the North Carolina Supreme Court is faced
with the problem presented by the instant case. In examining this
question it is necessary to consider the rules existing in Kentucky at
the time of the decision as compared with the present North Carolina
holdings.
Kentucky has held that, although the oral contract is unenforceable,
the party performing the contract is entitled to recover the reasonable
value of his services, where they are capable of monetary evaluation. 9
Where the performance by the promisee was not susceptible of monetary
evaluation, Kentucky had awarded the party performing the value of
the land promised to be devised.' 0 In the instant case the Kentucky
court concluded that awarding the plaintiff the value of the land promised
to be devised but refusing to give the plaintiff the land itself was unreasonable and illogical. The court stated:
Where the statute of frauds is so circumvented as to allow proof
of the terms of an oral contract and recovery of the value of the
property agreed to be devised or conveyed then to say that 'though
the thing itself cannot be recovered nor the contract specifically
enforced' . . . because the statute is still applicable is pure sophistry.... Originating in-Victorian circumlocution, the fiction does
not measure up to the practical requirements of justice and common sense.1"
'Vest v. Searce's Adm'r, 312 Ky. 181, 226 S.W2d 942 (1950) ; Rudd v. Planters
Bank & Trust Co., 283 Ky. 351, 141 S.W2d 299 (1940); Bowling v. Bowling's
Adm'r, 222 Ky. 396, 300 S.W. 876 (1927) ; Doty's Adm'r v. Doty's Guardian, 118
Ky. 204, 80 S.W. 803 (1904) ; Grant v. Craigmiles, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 203 (1808).
Gales v. Smith, 249 N.C. 263, 106 S.E.2d 164 (1958) ; Stewart v. Wyrick, 228
N.C. 429, 45 S.E.2d 764 (1947); Daughtry v. Daughtry, 223 N.C. 528, 27 S.E.2d
446 (1943) ; Price v. Askins, 212 N.C. 583, 194 S.E. 284 (1937). For earlier discussions of quantum ineruit in North Carolina as a basis of recovery where the
oral contract is unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds see Notes, 1 N.C.L.
REv. 48 (1922) and 15 N.C.L. REv. 203 (1936).
"Collins v. rmn, 233 Miss. 636, 103 So. 2d 425 (1958) ; Milam v. Paxton, 160
Miss. 562, 134 So. 171 (1931); Howie v. Swaggard, 142 Miss. 409, 107 So. 556
(1926) ; Fisher v. Kuhn, 54 Miss. 480 (1877) ; McGuire v. Stevens, 42 Miss. 724
(1869). Where the promisor has executed a will devising the property to the
promisee, it cannot subsequently be revoked. Johnston v. Tomme, 199 Miss. 337,
24 So. 2d 730 (1946). See Note, 18 Miss. L.J. 328 (1947).
'Burce v. Scruggs Equip. Co., 194 Tenn. 129, 250 S.W.2d 44 (1952) ; Goodloe
v. Goodloe, 116 Tenn. 252, 92 S.W. 767 (1906) ; Newman v. Carroll, 11 Tenn. 18

(1832).

r

,

Vest v. Searce s Adm r, 312 Ky. 181, 226 S.W.2f
Carpenter, 299 Ky. 738, 187 S.W.2d 282 (1945); Rudd
Co., 283 Ky. 351, 141 S.W.2d 299 (1940).
10 Bowling v. Bowling's Adm'r, 222 Ky. 396, 300
Adm'r v. Doty's Guardian, 118 Ky. 204, 80 S.W. 803
Adm'r, 82 Ky. 666 (1885).
11 Miller v. Miller, 335 S.W.2d 884, 889 (Ky. 1960).

942 (1950); Carpenter v.
v. Planters Bank & Trust
S.W. 876 (1927); Doty's
(1904) ; Benge v. Hiatt's
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North Carolina has consistently held that neither specific performance nor damages may be awarded on the oral contract to devise or to
convey realty. 12 Although the contract itself is unenforceable, monetary relief has been awarded on a quantunt ineruit basis in order to
prevent unjust enrichment where the promisee has performed.'5 If the
promisee's performance has been in the nature of services which were
capable of monetary evaluation, the measure of damages is the value
of the services. 14 Where the performance is incapable of monetary
evaluation, the North Carolina position is not clear. Redmon v.
Roberts15 presented facts alriost identical to those in the principal case.
There an illegitimate daughter brought suit against the estate of her
deceased father to recover on his oral promise to adopt her and to leave
her a part of his estate if the plaintiff's mother would not bring bastardy
proceedings against him. The court stated, in a dictum,' 6 that the
measure of damages would be the value of the property agreed to be
devised, and cited a Kentucky case as authority for the rule. In Hager
v. Whitener 7 the plaintiff moved his family to the deceased's home,
worked the land, and took care of the deceased in his old age in consideration of the promise by the deceased to devise all of his property
to the plaintiff.'17 The court adopted the dictum in Redmon v. Roberts
and awarded the plaintiff the value of the land promised to be devised
although the services were apparently capable of monetary evaluation.
In a later case, Granthamv.Grantham,18 the plaintiff also rendered personal services in consideration of the deceased's oral promise to devise
realty. The court reversed its position taken in the Hager case, holding
that the promisee was entitled to the value of the services, but that the
"nGales v. Smith, 249 N.C. 263, 106 S.E.2d 164 (1958) ; Jamerson v. Logan, 228
N.C. 540, 46 S.E.2d 561 (1948)2; Neal v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 224 N.C.
103, 29 S.E.2d 206 (1944); Grantham v. Grantham, 205 N.C. 363, 171 S.E. 331
(1933) ; Ballard v. Boyette, 171 N.C. 24, 86 S.F. 175 (1915); Hall v. Fisher, 126
N.C. 205, 35 S.F. 425 (1900); East v. Dolihite, 72 N.C. 562 (1875); Albea v.
Griffin, 22 N.C. 9, (1838).
"'Jamerson v. Logan, supra note 12; Stewart v. Wyrick, 228 N.C. 429, 45
S.E.2d 764 (1947) ; Daughtry v. Daughtry, 223 N.C. 528, 27 S.E.2d 446 (1943).
Plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages even though there is no allegation or proof
as to the reasonable value of the services. Gales v. Smith, supra note 12.
" Stewart v. Wyrick, supra note 13 (plaintiff rendered services to and advanced
money in behalf of the deceased); Price v. Askins, 212 N.C. 583, 194 S.E. 284
(1937).
15,198 N.C. 161, 150 S.E. 881 (1929).
18 The defendant failed to reserve the question for appeal so it was not before
the court.
-T204 N.C. 747, 169 S.E. 649 (1933).
IT'
It has been held that such performances are not susceptible of monetary
evaluation. Walker v. Calloway, 99 Cal. App. 2d 675, 222 P.2d 455 (Dist. Ct. App.
1955); Hanson v. Urner, 206 Md. 324, 111 A.2d 649 (1954). The general rule,
however, is that such performances may be adequately compensated for in money.
Hays v. Herman, 213 Ore. 140, 322 P.2d 119 (1958) ; Gossett v. Harris, 48 S.W.2d
739 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). See generally 49 Am. Jun. Statute of Frauds § 524
(1943) ;Annot., 101 A.L.R. 923, 1101-05 (1936).
1-6205 N.C. 363, 171 S.E. 331 (1933).
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value of the land might be admitted only as evidence to be considered by
the jury in determining the reasonable value of the services. In Grantham, however, as well as in all of the later decisions in which the rule
of the Grantham case has been applied, 19 the court has been concerned
with cases in which the performance by the promisee was capable of
monetary evaluation. Thus it is questionable whether the Grantham
decision would be a repudiation of the dictum in the Redmon case since
in Rednon the performance by the promisee was not capable of monetary evaluation.
Should the Redmon dictum be applicable on its facts, the prior Kentucky rule and the existing North Carolina rule would be the same.
This should add to the persuasiveness of the Kentucky decision. However, should our court decide that the Grantham rule applies also to the
cases in which the performance is not capable of monetary evaluation,
it is arguable that the North Carolina and prior Kentucky rules are
distinguishable. That is, whereas Kentucky awarded the value of the
land as damages, North Carolina has determined that the value of the
land is only evidence of the value of the performance. It has been
suggested that such a distinction is without substance because the jury
will ordinarily accept the standard set by the parties as the reasonable
20
worth of the performance by the promisee.
In considering cases presenting facts similar to the instant case, two
questions are posed: "(1) whether the policy of the statute [in preventing fraud] is saved, and (2) whether there is something in the particular case that calls for dispensing with a formal compliance with the
statute, its policy being saved, and makes it more equitable to go forward
and complete what the parties have begun."'21 The Kentucky court
discerned the inconsistency of its answer to these questions. Its prior
decisions had required a strict adherence to the Statute in holding the
contract unenforceable. Yet, the court would, in effect, enforce the oral
contract by awarding damages measured by the terms of the contract.
Where the performance by the promisee is not susceptible of monetary evaluation, there is no way to determine the value of the performance without accepting, or at least considering, the value set by the
parties themselves. Thus practicality requires dispensing with strict
"Gales v. Smith, 249 N.C. 263, 106 S.E.2d 164 (1958); Jamerson v. Logan,

228 N.C. 540, 46 S.E.2d 561 (1948) ; Stewart v. Wyrick, 228 N.C. 429, 45 S.E.2d
764 (1947); Coley v. Dalrymple, 225 N.C. 67, 33 S.E2d 477 (1945) ;' Grady v.

Raison, 224 N.C. 567, 31 S.E2d 760 (1944), Neal v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.,
224 N.C. 103, 29 S.E2d 206 (1944); Daughtry v. Daughtry, 223 N.C. 528, 27

S.E.2d 446 (1943); Price v. Askins, 212 N.C. 583, 194 S.E. 284 (1937); Lipe v.
Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 206 N.C. 24, 173 S.E. 316, aff'd on rehearing,207 N.C.

794z 178 S.E. 665 (1935).
'4 PAGE, WILLS 895 (3d ed. 1941).

" Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919-Equity, 33 HARV. L. Rny. 929,

944 (1920).
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adherence to the Statute and admission of the terms of the oral contract
for the purpose of measuring damages. Since this does not violate the
policy and purpose of the Statute, it would seem more logical and equitable to award the specific thing promised rather than to attempt its
measurement in damages. In doing so, the statutory policy and purpose
would be preserved equally as well. It is submitted that the Kentucky
court has adopted- the preferable position.
J. LEVONNE CHAMBERS

Worknen's Compensation-Neutral Risks-Causal Relation
Between Employment and Injury.
The workman's compensation statutes of most states prescribe as
one of the requirements of compensability that an injury must "arise out
of" the employment' of the worker, thus demanding a causal relation
between the job and the injury. Professor Larson has adopted a useful
threefold classification of the tests employed by the courts to determine
if an injury meets this requirement. Risks are designated as personal,
job related and neutral.2 An injury resulting from personal risk is one
completely unrelated to the employment and therefore not compensable.3
The injury from a job related risk is strictly confined to the hazards of
employment and is always compensable. 4 The third category, neutral
risk, includes all risks not personal or job related.5 The establishment
of the causal relation, the "arising out of" the employment, is a difficult
problem in these neutral risk injuries. In determining compensability
in such cases the courts have used three theories-increased risk, actual
risk and positional risk. This note will examine each of these theories
and will attempt to determine the present position of North Carolina in
this area.
In Pope v. Goodsen 6 a carpenter took shelter during a storm in a
partially completed building. He -vas wet from the rain and had a
nail pouch around his waist. As he stood near the window, lightning
struck the house, traveled down the window frame and passed through
1
E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §97-2(6) (1958); S.C. CODE §72-14 (Supp. 1959); VA.
CODE ANN. § 65-7 (1950). Contra, N.D. REv. CODE § 65-0102(8) (1957) ; UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 35-1-44 (1953).

For a discussion of "arising out of," see Vause v.

Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 63 S.E.2d 173 (1951).
21 LAlsON, WoRxmEN's COMPENSATION

§ 7 (1952).

'Compensation was denied to an employee assaulted while working, where the
assault was motivated by domestic difficulties. Harden v. Thomasville Furniture
Co., 199 N.C. 733, 155 S.E. 728 (1930).
'Compensation is so clearly appropriate that the issue is seldom litigated. For
"instance, if an operator of a saw were injured by a malfunction in that tool, the
risk is clearly job related.
'In neutral risks the cause of the harm may be known or unknown; this note
treats only the former type cases.
6 249 N.C. 690, 107 S.E.2d 524 (1959).
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the nail pouch and the legs of the carpenter, causing his death.
allowing compensation under the statute7 the court stated:

In

The generally recognized rule is that where the injured employee
is by reason of his employment peculiarly or specially exposed to
risk of injury from lightning-that is, one greater than other
persons in the community,--death or injury resulting from this
source usually is compensable as an injury by accident arising out
and in the course of the employment.8
The court followed the well-established majority rule9 in allowing
compensation because of the increased risk to the employee. The determining factor in granting compensation under the increased risk is
the greater likelihood of injury to the worker than to the general public;
if his employment subjected the employee to the additional danger, compensation is allowed.
There is no uniformity among courts which adhere to the increased
risk theory; opposite results have been reached on indistinguishable fact
situations,' 0 due to differences in defining the scope of the term "general
public." The Massachusetts court denied compensation to a laborer
whose foot was frozen while working outside before dawn in extremely
cold weather. The court stated, "In the performance of his work, there
is nothing to show that the employee was exposed to any greater risk
of freezing his foot than the ordinary person engaged in outdoor work
in cold weather."" On the other hand, in allowing compensation to the
widow of an employee who died from a heatstroke, the Texas court took
a more liberal view: "In the case before us the very work which the
deceased was doing for his employer exposed him to greater hazard
from heatstroke than the general public was exposed to for the simple
reason that the general public were not pushing wheelbarrow loads of
l2
sand in the sun on that day.'
Increased risk has been found where the employment of the worker
has merely exposed him to the elements (or whatever the harmful force).
Thus, increased risk of sunstroke was found by the Oklahoma court
7

N.C. GEN. STAT. §97-2(6) (1958).
S249 N.C. at 692, 107 S.E.2d at 525. Deceased was "specially exposed" because
he was wet and wearing a nail pouch.
*!g., Bales v. Covington, 312 Ky. 551, 228 S.W.2d 446 (1950) ; Kaiser v. Industrial Comm'n, 136 Ohio St. 440, 26 N.E2d 449 (1940); Hiers v. Brunson
Const. Co., 221 S.C. 212, 70 S.E.2d 211 (1952). See generally 58 Am. JuR. Workmen's Compensation §260 (1948) ; 71 C.J. Workmen's Compensation § 469 (1935);

99 C.J.S. Workmet's Compensation § 249 (1958).
" An employee took shelter under a tree during a thunder storm and was struck
by lightning; increased risk was found in Nelson v. Country Club, 329 Mich. 479,
45 N.W.2d 362 (1951). Contra, DeLuca v. Board of Park Comm'rs, 94 Conn. 7,

107 Atl. 611 (1919).
x
Robinson's Case, 292 Mass. 543, 545-46, 198 N.E. 760, 761 (1935).
1
rAmerican Gen. Ins. Co. v. Webster, 118 S.W.2d 1082, 1085-86 (Tex. Civr
App. 1938).
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when the work merely required that the employee be in the sun.13 In
most cases, however, there is an additional hazard more directly connected with the job. Heat from molten lead,1 4 reflected heat and deflected breeze,15 and objects which attract lightning 6 have been found
to be such additional factors. In the single case 17 involving heatstroke
which has reached the North Carolina Supreme Court, the evidence
showed that the employee had been working with molten lead which had
raised slightly the surrounding temperature. The court allowed compensation but indicated that had the additional factor not been present
recovery would have been denied. The increased risk theory has received general acceptance throughout the United States and has been
20
9
8
applied to accidents caused by lightning,' exposure,' windstorms,
22
21
earthquakes, and other neutral risks.
23
While professing to follow the increased risk rule, some courts
have developed the contact-with-the-premises exception. 24 Under this
exception when the worker has been injured by contact with part of his
occupational surroundings, regardless of the actuating force, sufficient
causal relation has been established and increased risk need not be shown.
This doctrine is illustrated by the statement, "If the bomb injures a
" The truck driven by the employee ran out of gas, and he suffered a sunstroke
while walking to a service station. Garfield County v. Best, 289 P.2d 677 (Okla.
1955).
1'Fields v. Tompkins-Johnston Plumbing Co., 224 N.C. 841, 32 S.E.2d 623
(1945).
2
" McNeil v. Omaha Flour Mills Co., 129 Neb. 329, 261 N.W. 694 (1935).
10 Stout v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 289 Ky. 736, 160 S.W.2d 31 (1942).
1Felds v. Tompkins-Jenkins Plumbing Co., 224 N.C. 841, 32 S.E.2d 623
(1945).
"lFort Pierce Growers Ass'n v. Storey, 158 Fla. 192, 29 So. 2d 205 (1947);
Stout v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 289 Ky. 736, 160 S.W. 2d 31 (1942) ; Bauer's Case, 314
Mass. 4, 49 N.E.2d 118 (1943) ; State v. Ramsey County Dist. Court, 129 Minn.
502, 153 N.W. 119 (1915) ; Sullivan v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 103 Mont. 117, 61

P.2d10838 (1936).
Vukovich v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Ariz. 187, 261 P.2d 1000 (1953) ; Larke

v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 90 Conn. 303, 97 Atl. 320 (1916) ; Murphey
v. I.C.U. Constr. Co. 158 Kan. 541, 148 P.2d 771 (1944); Nelson v. District
Court, 138 Minn. 260, 164 N.W. 917 (1918).
20 Reid v. Automatic Elec. Washer Co., 189 Iowa 964, 179 N.W. 323 (1920);
Merrill v. Penasco Lumber Co., 27 N.M. 632, 204 Pac. 72 (1922) ; Scott County
School Bd. v. Carter, 156 Va. 815, 159 S.E. 115 (1931) ; Scandrett v. Industrial
Comm'n, 235 Wis. 1, 291 N.W. 845 (1940).
" London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 202 Cal. 239, 259 Pac.
1096 (1927) ; Enterprise Dairy Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 202 Cal. 247, 259
Pac. 1099 (1927).
22 Borgeson v. Industrial Comm'r, 368 Ill.
188, 13 N.E.2d 164 (1938) (stray
bullet) ; Lexington Ry. Sys. v. True, 276 Ky. 446, 124 S.W.2d 467 (1939) (stray
bullet) ; Plemmons v. White's Serv., Inc., 213 N.C. 148, 195 S.E. 370 (1938) (bitten
by mad dog).
"' Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 26 N.E.2d 328 (1940); Dunnigan v. Clinton
Falls Nursery Co., 155 Minn. 286, 193 N.W. 466 (1923); Industrial Comm'n v.
Hampton, 123 Ohio St. 500, 176 N.E. 74 (1931); Brooker v. Borthwick & Sons
(Australasia), Ltd., [1933] A.C. 669 (N.Z.).
24 This exception could fit the actual risk theory also, but only courts following
the increased risk rule have utilized it. Courts using positional risk would find
causation from the fact that the employee was on the job.
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workman directly he must show special exposure; if it injures him indirectly by bringing the roof down on him, he can recover uncondi25
tionally."
While the contact-with-the-premises exception has not been applied
in North Carolina to an injury caused by an act of God, the court
26
apparently used this theory in allowing recovery in Perkins v. Sprott.
In that case the employee suffered an injury when a baseball broke the
window of the truck he was driving and the shattered glass struck him
in one eye. In its brief opinion the court did not mention increased risk
but stressed the fact that the glass rather than the baseball actually
caused the injury. The decision clearly implies that compensation would
27
not have been allowed if the baseball itself had struck the employee.
28
However, in Walker v. J. D. Wilkins, Inc. an employee was injured
when a tornado blew down the building in which he was working. The
injuries were caused by the falling debris, but compensation was not
granted because no increased risk was found. 29 This decision would
seem to be in conflict with the position taken in Sprott, but in Walker
neither the opinion of the court nor the briefs of the parties mentioned
the contact-with-the-premises exception.
The actual risk theory is a more liberal approach to the problem of
determining causal relation. Recovery is allowed if the employment
exposed the worker to a risk of the injury, and the likelihood of similar
harm to others in the community is not examined.30 This theory is
especially applicable to exposure cases, as the danger of freezing or sunstroke is common to many people in a designated area. An employee
who suffers a heatstroke while working in the hot sun might be denied
recovery under the increased risk theory, since everyone in the area is
subjected to the same risk.3 ' The actual risk theory would allow com"2Brooker v. Borthwick & Sons (Australasia), Ltd., [1933] A.C. 669, 678
(N.Z.).
2"207 N.C. 462, 177 S.E. 404 (1934).
""The injury to the plaintiff employee was the glass that hit him in the eye.
The baseball did not hit him." Id. at 464, 177 S.E. at 405. Compensation was
denied in two similar cases where a bullet struck the employee's eye directly. Bain
v. Travora Mfg. Co., 203 N.C. 466, 166 S.E. 301 (1932); Whitley v. Highway

Comm'n, 201 N.C. 539, 160 S.E. 827 (1931).
28212 N.C. 627, 194 S.E. 89 (1937).
2The contact-with-the-premises exception was utilized in allowing recovery
on similar facts in Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 26 N.E2d 328 (1940).
" Harding Glass Co. v. Albertson, 208 Ark. 866, 187 S.W.2d 961 (1945) (glass
cutter died from heat stroke); McKiney v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co., 79
Ga. App. 826, 54 S.E.2d 471 (1949) (worker in lumber yard struck by lightning) ;
Hughes v. Saint Patrick's Cathedral, 245 N.Y. 201, 156 N.E. 665 (1927) (grave
digger suffered heat stroke) ; Deziley v. Semet-Solvay Co., 272 App. Div. 985, 72
N.Y.S.2d 809 (1947) (struck by lightning while going to job); Eagle River Bldg.
& Supply Co. v. Peck, 199 Wis. 192, 225 NW. 690 (1929) (foot frozen in extreme weather).
"'In denying compensation to a coalheaver who suffered a sunstroke, the court
stated, "It is urged that physical labor has a tendency to induce sunstroke. No
doubt it has, but physical labor is not a hazard peculiar to a coalheaver." Lewis
v. Industrial Comm'n, 178 Wis. 449, 453; 190 N.W. 101, 102 (1922).
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pensation because the employment required the employee to work in the
sun and subjected him to the danger of sunstroke.3 2 This theory eliminates the problem found in the increased risk doctrine of defining the
scope of the term "general public."
The positional risk theory is the third and most liberal approach to
the problem; compensation is allowed when the employment caused the
worker to be in the position where the injury was received, irrespective
of the risk involved.3 3 The Colorado court in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Comr'n 4 allowed recovery for the death of a farm hand
killed by lightning. A concurring opinion summarized the holding and
illustrated this theory by stating:
An affirmance... established the rule that when one in the course
of his employment is reasonably required to be at a particular
place at a particular time and there meets with an accident, although one which any person then and there present would have
met irrespective of his employment, that accident is one "arising
out of" the employment of the person so injured.30
The North Carolina Supreme Court has been presented with two
cases3 6 in which the application of the positional risk doctrine would
have allowed recovery.37 In both an employee had been struck by a
stray bullet, and in both compensation was denied because of the absence of increased risk.
In summary, North Carolina has adhered to the increased risk theory
by using comparative danger between the worker and the general public
to determine if causation exists between the injury and the employment.38 The term "general public" has been interpreted liberally, how"-In granting compensation to an employee who suffered a heatstroke, the
court stated, "Although the risk may be common to all who are exposed to the
sun's rays on a hot day, the question is whether the employment exposes the employee to the risk." Hughes v. St. Patrick's Cathedral, 245 N.Y. 201, 202, 156 N.E.

665 38(1927).
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n 81 Colo. 233, 254 Pac. 995 (1927)
(farm hand struck by lightning) ; Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Co., 199
La. 720, 6 So2d 747 (1942) (cyclone demolished building and injured employee);
Gargiulo v. Gargiulo, 24 Nj. Super. 129, 93 A2d 598 (1952) (struck by arrow
shot by child); Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. Industrial Commn, 266 Wis. 81, 62
N.W2d 567 (1954) (assaulted by fellow employees for signing peace petition).
3,81 Colo. 233, 254 Pac. 995 (1927).
' Id. at 236, 254 Pac. at 996.
8

" Bain v. Travora Mfg. Co., 203 N.C. 466, 166 S.E. 301 (1932); Whitley v.
Highway Comm'n, 201 N.C. 539, 160 S.E. 827 (1931).

" See Truck Ins. Exch. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 147 Cal. App. 2d 460,
305 P.2d 55 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957) ; Gargiulo v. Gargiulo, 24 N.J. Super 129, 93
A.2d 598 (1952).
" Special danger was found where a night watchman was killed by an unknown
assailant. West v. East Coast Fertilizer Co., 201 N.C. 556, 160 S.E. 765 (1931).
Compensation was denied on the ground that the risk was common to the neighborhood in Lockey v. Cohen, Goldman & Co., 213 N.C. 356, 196 S.E. 342 (1938)
(employee slipped on fruit peel in employer's parking lot). Increased risk was
found in Pope v. Goodsen, 249 N.C. 690, 107 S.E.2d 524 (1959), and Fields v.
Tompkins-Johnston Plumbing Co., 224 N.C. 841, 32 S.E.2d 623 (1945).
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ever to mean all persons in the general vicinity, not just those doing
the same or similar work. 9 The status of the contact-with-the-premises
exception is unclear due to an apparent conflict in holdings.40 Neither
the actual 4 ' nor the positional4 risk theory has been adopted by the court.
JAmas H. CARSON, JR.
Wrongful Death-Measure of Damages-Evidence of
Retirement Income.
In the recent case of Bryant v. Woodlief' the North Carolina Supreme Court held that evidence of railroad retirement payments received
by the decedent is admissible on the issue of damages in a wrongful
death action. 2 This holdings and the court's incidental discussion of the
measure of damages in North Carolina raises two questions. First, how
far will the court extend the holding in Bryant, which seemingly is in
conflict with prior decisions, to other types of income similar to that
involved in the principal case? Secondly, what inference can be drawn
from the inconsistency reflected in the court's discussion in Bryant?
The evidence admitted in the principal case is difficult to reconcile
with the tacit rule of past cases that wrongful death damages in North
" See Pope v. Goodsen, supra note 38; Fields v. Tompkins-Jenkins Plumbing

Co., supra note; 38 Plemmons v. White's Serv., Inc., 213 N.C. 148, 195 S.E. 370

(1938).
" Perkins v. Sprott, 207 N.C. 462, 177 S.E. 404 (1934) ; Whitley v. Highway
Comm'n, 201 N.C. 539, 160 SE. 827 (1931). The application of the exception
could leave the court in an illogical position if a case ever arose where one eye
was injured directly by an object and the other eye injured by shattered glass
from a window. Apparently compensation would be awarded for injury to one
eye under the premises exception but disallowed for the other under the increased
risk theory.
" The language in Fields v. Tompkins-Johnston Plumbing Co., 224 N.C. 841, 32
S.E.2d 623 (1945), strongly indicates that no recovery would be allowed for a
heatstroke suffered on a hot day unless some additional harmful factor were present. The actual risk theory would require nothing more than labor in the hot sun.
Compare Hughes v. St. Patrick's Cathedral, 245 N.Y. 201, 156 N.E. 665 (1927).
"'Utilization of the positional risk doctrine would have allowed compensation
in Whitely v. Highway Conm'n, 201 N.C. 466, 160 S.E. 827 (1931).
1252 N.C. 488, 114 SE2d 241 (1960).
'Heskamp v. Bradshaw's Adm'r, 294 Ky. 618, 172 S.W.2d 447 (1943), was
relied upon in the principal case. Kentucky's death statute, Ky. REv. STAT. § 411.130
(1959), has been construed to provide recovery for "loss to the estate." Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Bank's Adm'r, 153 Ky. 629, 156 S.W. 109 (1913). The North
Carolina statute, N.C. Gm. STAT. § 28-174 (1950), is given the same construction.
Rea v. Simowitz, 226 N.C. 379, 38 S.E2d 194 (1946).
'Other jurisdictions have reached the same result; Kowtko v. Delaware &
Hudson RL1L, 131 F. Supp. 95 (M.D. Penn. 1955) (training subsistence payments
App. 2d 527, 151
from the Veterans Administration); Barrow v. Lence, 17 Ill.
App. 437,
N.E2d 120 (1958) (monthly pension) ; Trust Co. v. Cummings, 320 Ill.
51 N.E.2d 616 (1943) (old age assistance); Jessee v. Slate, 196 Va. 1074, 86
S.E.2d 821 (1955) (monthly social security payments). And the measure of
damages used is not determinative of the question of the admissibility of such
evidence. Virginia, for example, allows such evidence and its measure is "loss to
certain near relatives.' Conrad v. Thompson, 195 Va. 714, 80 S.E.2d 561 (1954).
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Carolina are to be based on loss of income expected from probable future
exertions of the decedent. Although never formally stated, this rule has
developed around the phrase, "from his own exertions during his life
expectancy," which relates to the determination of net pecuniary value
of decedent's life. This value is ascertained by deducting probable living
costs of the decedent from his probable gross income expected to be
derived from his own exertions during his life expectancy.4 The use of
the words "exertions during his life expectancy" would seem to mean
exertions during that time the decedent -%ould have had earnings but for
the wrongful act. To be admissible, therefore, the probable income must
be due to exertions of the decedent which would have been performed
had the decedent lived out his life expectancy. Under this interpretation
it is clear that .the rewards from exertions prior to death are not to be
considered; thus the phrase would not seem to comprehend retirement
pensions. Such rewards from past earnings would be a part of the decedent's accumulated capital rather than a part of his probable future
earnings.
In essence the question before the court in Bryant was whether the
evidence was to be restricted to decedent's probable future earnings or
whether probable earnings plus income from other sources should be
admitted. By admitting evidence of retirement income the court decided in favor of the latter alternative. Thus the court drew no distinction between the income expected from future earnings and that attributable to past earnings. The only restriction placed on the admissibility
of evidence of income from sources other than future earnings by the
court in Bryant is that the income must be of such a nature as to stop
upon the death of the decedent. 5 The court adopted the theory that a
pension is a substitute for earning power. This may be so in practical
result; but the legal theory of the tacit or unexpressed rule does not seem
to be satisfied thereby. The court should have stated that they could
find no sound basis for excluding evidence of pension income which is
attributable to the past exertions of the decedent while allowing consideration of income from probable future exertions. Although the
court has never held that income like that in Bryant was inadmissible,
the language of the previous decisions 6 would not seem logically to
warrant the result in the principal case. If the plain meaning of these
previous cases is not to be followed, then it should be so stated. Other'Journigan v. Little River Ice Co., 233 N.C. 180, 184, 63 S.E.2d 183, 186 (1951);
Rea v. Simowitz, 226 N.C. 379, 38 S.E.2d 194 (1946); Carpenter v. Asheville
Power & Light Co., 191 N.C. 130, 131 S.E. 400 (1926); Russell v. Windsor
Steamboat Co., 126 N.C. 961, 36 S.E. 191 (1900).
5252 N.C. at 494, 114 S.E. at 246, "[W]e do not understand that the general
rule in this respect would exclude the inclusion of income from an annuity, life
estate, retirement pay, or other income for life only, in arriving at the pecuniary
loss sustained by reason of wrongful death."
' Cases cited note 4 supra.
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wise, Bryant will stand as dubious precedent for any type of life income
rather than pensions.
Whatever might be said about the apparent conflict with precedent,
the principal case does, this writer submits, reach a sound result. There
seems to be no valid reason why evidence of probable future earnings
should be admitted and evidence of future income from past earnings
excluded. The time of the actual exertion does not seem significant.
Indeed whether the income was derived from any exertion at all does
not logically affect what the estate of the decedent has lost by his wrong
ful death because the loss of a life income in any form is a pecuniary loss
which the estate of the decedent has suffered.7 Also, as was pointed out
in Bryant,8 it is more reasonable to assume that a pension will continue
until the pensioner's death than that salary or wages would continue.
The problem is how far should the court go in admitting evidence of
income other than that attributable to past or future exertions and to
what extent it will feel bound by its language in previous cases.
The court intimated that it will admit evidence of any kind of life
income which death has cut short, to wit: "an annuity, life estate, retirement pay or other income for life only." 9 Conceivably, however,
some problems may arise in applying this broad statement to differing
fact situations. If the annuity, for example, is of the survivorship type
providing larger payments to the decedent than to his widow it may not
be readily apparent what the estate has lost. 10 If the life estate, to use
another illustration, was held jointly by the decedent and another, the
question is also a closer one than that in the principal case.
Because of the unexpressed rule it is even possible, although the court
in Bryant does not say so, that in future cases an inquiry will be made
into how the decedent acquired the life estate or right to a life income,
so that evidence of a gift of such an interest could be excluded. It is
submitted, however, that such a result should not be encouraged because
nothing in Bryant requires the courts to look beyond the life income
itself. Rather the opinion seems to establish only one criterion to use
in the admission of evidence of income, and that is -whether the wrongful
death terminated income or property rights which the decedent would
have had for the remainder of his life. Under this rule it would not
Of course, if the property which produced the income is owned by the decedent,
e.g., a trust fund, there is no ground for admitting such income because it is not
affected adversely by the death of the decedent. The rule that investment income
is not admissible demonstrates the application of this principle. See, e.g., White v.
North Carolina R.R., 216 N.C. 79, 3 S.E2d 310 (1939); Underwood v. Old
Colony St. Ry. Co., 33 R.I. 319, 80 Atl. 390 (1911).
8252 N.C. at 497, 114 S.E.2d at 248.
' Id.at 494, 114, S.E.2d at 246.
" A sum equal to the difference in the two payments would seem one logical
answer. Nevertheless it is clear that where the estate (or beneficiary) receives
less than the decedent would have had he lived, a sum equal to that difference is
ascertainable and should be included in the computation of probable future earnings.
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matter that the decedent had been given his life income as a gift or that
he had purchased the same with capital savings, salary earnings, or
windfall receipts like remote inheritances or raffle prizes.
If this interpretation of the court's statements and holding in Bryant
is correct, it seems clear that they amount to a repudiation of the tacit
rule.1 ' On the other hand, regardless of the outcome of any future
controversy concerning the source of the income, the mere admission of
evidence of the product of previously earned income is an extension of
that rule.
The second question raised by the opinion in the Bryant case concerns the proper measure of damages for wrongful death in North
Carolina.
The common law gave no remedy for wrongful death since the decedent's rights for tortious injury were considered to be personal and
to terminate upon his death.12 England in 184613 and North Carolina
in 185414--changed this situation by giving to the personal representatives of the deceased a statutory right of action for wrongful death.
Today there are three different views of what constitutes a proper
measure of damages for wrongful death.1, One view regards the proven
pecuniary loss sustained by certain members of the family as the proper
measure. Under this rule the plaintiffs may prove loss of financial
assistance from the decedent 16 and loss of services of a pecuniary value
by reason of decedent's death.17 Competent evidence includes the health
of the plaintiffs,18 their life expectancy and financial condition 9 and their
relationship to the decedent. 20 The "loss to the family" measure is the
majority rule2 ' and is the measure used by the English courts. 22 It is
23
also the rule adopted under the Federal Employer's Liability Act.
Another view, held by a small minority, is that the size of the recovery depends upon the degree of the defendant's culpability and is unrelated to pecuniary loss.24
1'
See text accompanying note 4 supra.
1
'Armentrout v. Hughes, 247 N.C. 631, 101 S.E2d 793 (1958).
"'Lord Campbell's Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
1
N.C. Pub. Laws 1854, ch. 39. The present statute is N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173
(1950).
1
16 McCORmicx, DAMAGES § 95 (1935).
Meekin v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 164 N.Y. 145, 58 N.E. 50 (1900).
1
Lichtenstein v. L. Fish Furniture Co., 272 Ill. 191, 111 N.E. 729 (1916).
8
Simoneau v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 166 Cal. 264, 136 Pac. 544 (1913).
"Francis v. Atchison, T.

& S.F. Ry.,

113 Tex. 202, 253 S.W. 819 (1923).

Pierce v. Conners, 20 Colo 178 37 Pac. 721 (1894).
slMcCoRmicr, DAxAGES § 106 (1935). See generally 44 HARv. L. REv. 980
(1931).
"'Barnettv. Cohen, [1921] 2 K.B. 461; 28 HALSBtRY LAws OF ENGLAND § 110
(3d ed. 1959).
" Kansas City So. Ry. v. Leslie, 238 U.S. 599 (1915) ; Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe
R.R. Co. v. McGinnis, 228 U.S. 173 (1913).
' MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 229, § 2C (1955); Macchiaroli v. Howell, 294 Mass.
144, 200 N.E. 905 (1936).
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By the third view, which is followed in North Carolina, 25 what is
sought is compensation for the pecuniary loss to the decedent's estate.
This loss is usually determined by deducting probable future personal
living expenses from probable future gross income of the decedent.
Under this measure it would not seem to matter whether there are any
next of kin of the decedent since the recovery would-under the North
0
Carolina view 2 1-escheat
to the state as would intestate property where
decedent leaves no relatives.
The reason a question about the North Carolina measure is raised
by the Bryant opinion is that the court cites early North Carolina cases
in conflict with the "loss to the estate" rule. These early cases are to
the effect that the proper measure of damages is the loss to the family
of the decedent. In Collier v. Arrington,2 7 the court said that the only
question was "how much has the plaintiff [widow] lost by the death of

the person injured." And in Kesler v.Smith2 8 the language used was,

"what was the reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage to the
family of the deceased from the continuance of his life." There are
several other early cases using similar language,29 and there is even
judicial expression to the effect that such cases were following the English rule.30
Another and more recent group of cases employ the phrase "loss to
the estate -of the decedent" as stating the proper measure.31 In other
recent cases, however, the court seems to have returned to the principle
of "loss to the family." Hanks v. Norfolk & W. Ry. 3 2 was such a case;
the court allowed evidence of a guilty plea by the decedent in a nonsupport action on the theory that it showed decedent's character. It was
the defendant's intention, thus to show how little the decedent's family
had lost, in a pecuniary sense, by the decedent's death. In Lamm v.
Lorbacher3 the trial judge charged the jury to "arrive at the pecuniary
'"McCoy

v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 229 N.C. 57, 47 S.E2d 532 (1948);

Carpenter v. Asheville Power & Light Co., 191 N.C. 130, 131 S.E. 400 (1926);

Russell v. Windsor Steamboat Co., 126 N.C. 961; 36 S.E. 191 (1900). It is interesting to note that while the proceeds of a wrongful death recovery are to be
disbursed in accordance with the statute of distribution, such funds are not part
of the decedent's estate so as to be subject to decedent's debts. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§28-173 (1950).

" McCoy v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 229 N.C. 57, 47 S.E.2d 532 (1948);

Warner v. Western N.C. R.R., 94 N.C. 250 (1886).
27 61 N.C. 356, 358 (1867).

-8 66 N.C. 154, 157 (1872).
E.g., Carter v. Railroad, 139 N.C. 499, 52 SZE. 642 (1905); Mendenhall v.

20

North Carolina R.R., 123 N.C. 275, 31 S.E. 480 (1898) ; Burton v. Wilmington &
Weldon R.R., 82 N.C. 505 (1880).
" Purnell v. Rocldngham R.R., 190 N.C. 573, 130 S.E. 313 (1925).

E.g., Carpenter v. Asheville Power & Light Co., 191 N.C. 130, 131 S.E. 400
(1926) ; Horton v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 175 N.C. 472, 95 S.E. 883 (1918).
8 230 N.C. 179, 52 S.E.2d 717 (1949). This case and the earlier North Carolina decisions on this point are discussed in Note, 28 N.C.L. REv. 106 (1949).
" 235 N.C. 728, 71 S.E.2d 49 (1952).
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worth of the deceased to her family or estate."3 4 The court held that
the use of the word "family" in the connection in which it was used may
be understood as meaning "estate" and thus the charge was not in error.
It is doubtful that the jury understood the word in other than its common meaning. Then in Armentrout v. Hughess the court said, "Our
statute has from its passage been interpreted to accord with the interpretation given by the English courts to Lord Campbell's Act."30; This
broad statement evidently overlooked Russell v. Windsor Steamboat
Co.,37 wherein it was pointed out that North Carolina has a measure of
damages different from that used by the English courts.
In the principal case the court quotes with approval the language of
three of the early North Carolina cases previously mentioned herein.38
Also the court cites 30 an English case which held that a father who had
a reasonable expectation of benefit from the continuance of his son's life
could maintain an action for damages for his wrongful death. This
result seems quite proper under the English or "loss to the family" rule,
but it could not follow from the North Carolina or "loss to the estate"
rule.
It is not clear what the court sought to achieve in Bryant by its collection of seemingly contradictory authority, but it is possible that a
change in the law is contemplated. There is, however, an expression
in the opinion to the effect that no former opinion is sought to be altered,
modified, or overruled.40 In spite of this disclaimer there does seem
to be a shift towards the English or majority rule. There also possibly
emerges a trend away from the judicially self-imposed test of "income
derived from deceased's own exertions" and back to the language of
the statute itself which is: "fair and just compensation for the pecuniary
41
injury, resulting from such death."
In summary it can only be said that Bryant perpetuates the confusion
surrounding this area of the law, even if it does not alter precedent.
OLIVER W. ALPEIN
" Id. at 729, 71 S.E2d at 50.
247 N.C. 631, 101 S.E.2d 793 (1958).
" Id. at 632, 101 S.E.2d at 795.
27 126 N.C. 961, 36 S.E. 191 (1900).
"Mendenhall v. North Carolina RR, 123 N.C. 275, 31 S.E. 480 (1898);
Kesler v. Smith, 66 N.C. 154 (1872) ; Collier v. Arrington, 61 N.C. 356 (1867).
290 252 N.C. at 496, 114 S.E.2d at 247.
Id. at 498, 114 S.E.2d at 248.
"IN.C. Gax. STAT. § 28-174 (1950).

